

EAST EUROPE

A Monthly Review of East European Affairs

A stylized, high-contrast map of Eastern Europe, showing the outlines of countries and major bodies of water like the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. The map is rendered in a dark, textured style.

SMUGGLING

COMMUNIST TRADERS LOOK ABROAD

THE STALINIST PRESS

LABOR BRIGADES

Polish Writers' Congress

The Priest and the Jester

"I Lost a Tooth"

FEBRUARY 1960

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EAST EUROPE

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EAST EUROPE is a monthly review of political, economic, social and intellectual trends and events in the Soviet orbit. Information contained in this magazine is derived in the main from East European sources and is based on a thorough analysis by specialists from Central and East European countries of all major Communist newspapers and publications and the complete monitoring of Communist broadcasts.

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The Month in Review



THE PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE of States with differing social systems does not weaken the ideological struggle, for our Party has been waging and will continue to wage a relentless struggle for Communist ideology, the most progressive and truly scientific ideology of our time." These are the words of the Soviet Party Central Committee in its recent call for improved propaganda and indoctrination, and these are also the words of many other voices in the Soviet bloc. The implication is that the Communist ideology is clearly articulated and monolithic. Yet, as often before, the events of the month reveal a swarm of variations and divagations among the countries of the East European Soviet bloc which, Premier Khrushchev has said, are supposed to "enter Communism" together. Perhaps the most amusing of the variations involved that arch-spirit of Communist uniformity, Josef Stalin. December 21 was the eightieth anniversary of the old dictator's birth (it is a little short of seven years since his death). In honor of the occasion, Moscow's *Pravda* printed a long article which briskly conceded Stalin's merits as an "irreconcilable fighter against Tsarist absolutism and capitalism," but went on to criticize at startling length his "serious mistakes," his restrictions of "Soviet and Party democracy," his "deviations," his "mass repressions." The article even quoted the famed remarks of Lenin on Stalin, the so-called "last testament": "Stalin is too rude. . . . I propose that the comrades consider means by which Stalin could be removed. . . ."

Communist China, however, in its new role of "apostle of the left," gave Stalin high praise and only briefly referred to certain "mistakes." Likewise Albania, which consistently acts as if Stalin had never died, and also Czechoslovakia, where the old Stalinist functionaries perhaps thought this a safe occasion to differ from the USSR. Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania printed articles similar to the Moscow piece, although less vigorous, and Poland—in its typical poker-faced way—published no remarks of its own but printed the *Pravda* article in full.

Such diversity would have shocked Stalin, quite aside from his personal feelings; he would probably have been equally shocked by some of the recent activities of his successor, Nikita Khrushchev. Between domestic exhortation and international pronouncement, Khrushchev moves almost too fast for the eye to follow. In one recent speech he announced a sizable unilateral reduction of the Soviet armed forces, boasted of the Soviet's ownership of new "incredible weapons" in addition to H-bombs and rockets, and, casually, revealed hard figures for the size of the Soviet army—figures which had been guessed at for years by Western intelligence, and which Stalin would have shot half his Politburo for whispering to each other. However hopeful one may be for the new disarmament proposals, one must note that it is only a few weeks since Premier Khrushchev flatly stated that Soviet troops are to remain in Hungary: there have been no indications that disarmament and troop reductions are to affect the nations of Eastern Europe.

Another shock for the ghost of Stalin came from that perennial anomaly of Communist ideology, Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia. Increasingly, it seems clear, relations between Tito and the Soviet bloc—with the outstanding exceptions of China and Albania—are improving. Even Bulgaria, long a loud voice in the chorus denouncing

(Continued on page 43)

Voluntary Work

Mobilizing the New "Socialist Labor Brigades"

"WHAT WOULD YOU SAY," tumbled *Rude Pravo* last June 14, "if the postman brought you a mimeographed letter with the official stamp of the national committee on it, stating that you were expected in a specific place at a specific day and hour, where you would be assigned part of an onion field to work on? If you didn't turn up, you would be fined up to 50,000 *koruny* or imprisoned for up to six months." The Czechoslovak Communist newspaper was complaining at the methods employed by some local officials in requisitioning labor for harvest work. Like so much of the criticism that appears in the Communist press, this blast was directed not at the official policy of getting citizens to donate their labor to various government projects, but at the way the policy was mishandled by lower functionaries.

"Brigades," as the Communists call them, are busy all over Eastern Europe in the current drive to multiply production by making one hand do the work of two. Bulgaria has put brigades of peasants to work digging irrigation ditches and improving the fields during the winter months when peasants traditionally take life easier. In Romania 2,500 people of all ages were said to have "wholeheartedly given up their leisure hours" to dig ditches for the Bucharest water system. (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], October 28, 1958.) Even in Poland, where the Communists have forsworn some of their cruder tactics, a campaign is under way to build 1,000 schools by 1966 from the proceeds of voluntary overtime work and from money contributions. There are youth brigades for building railroads, children's brigades for collecting garbage, citizens' brigades, emergency brigades, and what might be called floating brigades



If you want a school . . . build it yourself. The photo sh

which are rushed to various factories to help fulfill production targets.

Wanted: That Extra Hour

The brigades are a Soviet invention dating back to the days of shockwork and Stakhanovism, taken over by the East European Communists along with the rest of Stalin's apparatus. The use of brigades declined during the political thaw of the mid-1950s, but in the past two years they have been revived as the area falls into step with Moscow's new economic drive. The brigades make it possible to mobilize manpower not utilized in the normal functioning of factory and farm; they provide the State with extra money and cheap labor; they help to ensure the attainment of plans which are too ambitious to be carried through in a conventional way; and they permit the State planners to concentrate a larger proportion of the national budget on the expansion of heavy industry in preference to schools, highways and rural development.

In the capital-scarce Communist countries, where machines are precious as gold, cheap labor is an important national asset. In times gone by, the use of political prisoners and other kinds of forced labor was a notorious phenomenon in the Soviet bloc; while these have been abolished, the Communists still collect "donations" of overtime work, Sunday work and vacation time. A major part in the new brigade movement has been assigned to high school and university students; last summer thousands of students performed "voluntary work" for no pay at all.

The most conspicuous use of labor brigades is in agri-



men in the Slovak village of Motova digging foundations. A man supervises, and small boys look on.

Slovenka (Bratislava), July 27, 1959

culture. In Czechoslovakia the swollen industrial towns have drained manpower out of agriculture, and the collectivization of farming has given peasant youth an additional incentive to flee the land. Every year at harvest time the press and radio resound with propaganda for harvest brigades, to the point where an uninitiated observer might conclude that the country was threatened with starvation unless everybody turned out to bring in the crop. In Bulgaria, where the population is still predominantly employed in agriculture, the emphasis is on getting the peasants to work harder during the slack season. Late in 1958 the Bulgarian Communists tore up their new Five Year Plan and launched the country on a "great leap forward"—resembling, in some respects, the great ordeal in Communist China. Bulgaria was to double its agricultural production in two years and treble it in three. To the extent that this fantastic program had any rationale, it was that of exploiting the reserves of rural manpower to bring more land under cultivation and to increase production per acre. The policy was also extended to the cities and towns, where factories were put on three shifts and white-collar workers were marshalled to dig ditches.

These campaigns, naturally, meet with a good deal of quiet resistance from the people. To keep them going the governments have to double their exhortations and combine them with other inducements such as medals, vacation trips and public applause for exemplary "brigadiers." Moreover, much of the "volunteer" work performed is inevitably of poor quality or for the record only, and there are cases where it simply aggravates existing economic difficulties. But as long as Moscow presses for higher

and higher production targets, this type of labor exploitation seems bound to continue.

HOW THEY WORK

IN BULGARIA, THE role and pattern of "voluntary labor" in the economy is particularly clear. One part of the people's obligations is covered in a law on "self-taxation" which stipulates that citizens must contribute either cash or labor to help realize projects of "local significance"—that is, the construction of schools, irrigation projects, highways, water pipes, cultural homes, etc. Able-bodied men from 18 to 60 and women from 18 to 55 contribute 40 work hours a year or, if they have a cart, 20 work hours. They are sometimes given the choice of substituting cash—up to 16 leva for every work hour—for all or part of their voluntary labor, and from recent information in the press it appears that the trend is toward cash contribution (*Izvestia* [Sofia], February 11, 1958).

In the city of Plovdiv, self-taxation in 1958 amounted to a 1.5 percent income tax and three voluntary work days; in 1959, voluntary labor was abolished and the tax increased to two percent. This decision evidently was based on the assumption that labor required for local projects could be recruited by other means: "The effect of self-taxation will be increased by at least 15-20 percent if we are able to organize correctly the labor of 15,000-17,000 persons who must contribute 500,000 work days." (*Otechestven Glas* [Plovdiv], February 17, 1959.)

The term "self-taxation" is obviously a euphemism. The



"Look here, son," says the old man, "this is the edge of the spade. This is how you use it when the soil becomes too hard to dig."

Magyar Hírszolg (Budapest), July 11, 1959

thing really amounts to an income tax which is not at all voluntary and which is used to finance projects not directly included in State expenditures. Some of these projects, financed locally, are completed by the voluntary labor of office employees and other persons not regularly engaged in so-called material production. According to a law of December 20, 1958, physically fit Bulgarian men up to fifty and women not older than 45 "are permitted" to do voluntary work in agriculture or industry for thirty work days a year while receiving pay from their own institutions. Self-employed persons are at a greater disadvantage: they receive no remuneration at all and must be content with the promise of a pension in case of disability caused on the "voluntary" job.

Bureaucrats Go Forth

A typical instance of such "patriotic activity" was recorded by *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), April 2, 1959, which stated that, since March 20, employees from the Ministry of Agriculture and 200 lawyers from the Sofia People's Council had been working on the construction of a canal: "A total of 2,400 persons from the Ministry of Justice, the National and Central Council of the Father-

land Front and the Central Council of Labor Productive Cooperatives went to work on April 1." Between that date and the end of October, "over 580,000 employees and other categories of people not employed in material production participated in voluntary manual labor and worked over 4.88 million working days, their work being valued at over 72 million leva." (*Otechestven Front* [Sofia], January 6, 1960.) The newspapers have not explained how State enterprises and institutions can manage to release so many personnel from posts where they are presumably needed.

As well as conscripting workers, intellectuals and office employees, the regime relies heavily on the recruitment of young people, to whom it has allocated "a large share in this patriotic upsurge." During the Stalinist era youth brigades were used constantly in agriculture and industry, but the practice was discontinued in 1951, most likely because their work was not up to par. In 1957, however, the practice was revived: student brigades were shipped to the countryside to aid collective farms and help in harvesting, and in 1958 the system was expanded in conjunction with the "great leap forward." According to *Rabotnichesko Delo*, February 26, 1959, over 100,000 students took part in brigade work in the summer of 1958, and increases were planned for 1959:

"In the future, students will be required to participate more actively in economic construction. Brigades will be formed to participate in the building of small dams, irrigation canals, school buildings, hostels, gymnasiums, in terracing and preparing soil for afforestation, and in assisting the collective and State farms. . . . All this, for carrying out a decisive leap in our economic development and for establishing the closest connection between school and life."

And Children Too

In 1959, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist youth organization issued a decision stating that, in the drive to fulfill the Five Year Plan in three years, every peasant youth would be obliged to contribute at least thirty days to the brigades (*Narodna Mladez* [Sofia], March 2, 1959). By the spring of 1959 a large-scale campaign was already underway. *Kooperativno Delo*, May 10, 1959, reported: "There are already 470 projects on which more than 91,000 high school and university student brigadiers will work. A considerable number of high school students will be included in local brigades to help collective and State farms, or put to work on land allotted to schools, or in industrial enterprises, according to their scholastic speciality."

The Bulgarian practice has spread during the past year to other East European countries. Communist publications announce exultantly the savings attained through local contributions of money and voluntary work, including the activities of school children assigned to collecting garbage, scrap metal, waste paper, etc., as though joyous millions were willingly dedicating every ounce of available strength to the building of Socialism. Several quotations from the Romanian press give the flavor of these communications. On January 21, 1959, the Party daily *Scinteia* (Bucharest)

commented that through "intelligent use" of money contributions amounting to more than ten million *lei*, and with the help of the people the municipal governments in the Oradea region had built within the past year "some 360 cultural homes, schools, dispensaries, kindergartens, etc." The same paper, on October 18, 1958, referring to the improvement of the water system in Bucharest, declared: "There are 2,500 citizens, men and women, young and old, who have wholeheartedly renounced their leisure hours to take part in this useful work. . . ." And in a discussion of land reclamation on October 28, 1959, *Scinteia* published the following:

"Thousands of . . . farmers, with the help of workers and employees from enterprises and institutions, sprang to the call of the Party to conquer new land for agriculture through voluntary work. Many of those who came decided to work not one or two days, but many weeks. They raised tents, prepared food on campfires, spent the evenings gaily—but, in the morning they again started their assault on the waters. . . . The savings realized through voluntary labor gave the State the opportunity to invest money in other sectors of the national economy, especially in industry."

MYTH AND REALITY

OTHER ARTICLES IN THE Communist press suggest that the contribution and brigade system is neither as efficient nor as economical as it might seem, and that the "enthusiastic, communal spirit" of the people is largely an organized myth. Local officials have been reprimanded for ignoring directives which regulate labor recruitment, or for using arbitrary methods in filling their quotas—sins

which are no doubt based on the difficulties encountered in persuading hardworking citizens to give up their leisure hours.

The most open admission of popular indifference has come from Poland, where the Communists have been extremely cautious in their attempts to elicit additional sacrifices from the people. In connection with a drive to collect money and materials for school construction, Politburo member Zenon Kliszko, speaking to the Presidium of the All Poland Committee of the National Unity Front, acknowledged that fund-raising in the countryside was particularly difficult, and that it was not always advisable to ask for "donations" of extra working days. Referring to the practice of "school Sundays," where miners worked Sundays to produce extra coal to make building materials, Kliszko declared: "We do not recommend school Sundays in other branches of industry. Experience indicates that results are very moderate and that the attitude of the workers varies. Most enterprises have neither the material nor the technological facilities for an extra working day. Often a considerable number of workers will not give up their Sunday rest and fail to appear. . . ." (*Trybuna Ludu*, June 3, 1959.)

Complaints about the "bourgeois" attitude of young people, and sluggishness in the transfer of white collar employees to temporary work in industry, show that "voluntary labor" is generally resisted by all segments of the population. On one occasion the Bulgarian paper *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), July 22, 1959, declared: "At a time when the stadium in the town of Elena needed many workers, the directors of . . . several enterprises . . . did not send a single employee to contribute voluntary physical work."



Bulgaria is emphasizing land reclamation and afforestation in its "voluntary work" program. Here, young people are planting trees.

Bulgaria Today (Sofia), May 1958



Young Bulgarians terracing a hillside near Kopilofzi.

Narodna Mladej (Sofia), August 13, 1959

The Goldbrickers

Difficulties also arise in the treatment accorded brigades sent out to perform tasks that are supposedly necessary and urgent. Numerous reports from Czechoslovakia relate that collective farmers frequently take advantage of brigade workers, who are assigned the heaviest and dirtiest work. The newspaper *Prace* (Prague), August 6, 1958, described how farmers often neglected to make minor but crucial repairs of machinery required by the brigadiers, and spoke of a case where "local citizens were seen bathing in the pond while the brigade workers were harvesting the barley." Military brigades, sent to work on collective and State farms, have had dismal experiences. According to *Obrana Lidu* (Prague), September 21, 1958, "many collectives expect constant daily help from the soldiers, taking advantage of [their] good will" and the prevailing attitude of the farmers could be summed up by the words: "The soldiers will do it, after all" or "They have nothing to do anyhow." *Zemelske Noviny* (Prague), September 4, 1957, charged that "many collectives and State farms do not even provide hot water so the brigade workers can wash," and other items in the Czechoslovak press have described the plight of young people in hop-picking brigades who wrote bitter letters home about the terrible food the collectives were giving them. There have also been reports of school children forced to work as long as thirteen hours a day.

Because farmers evidently have used the brigades as an excuse for taking it easy, the Czechoslovak government has tried to restrict the collectives' requests for help. *Prace*, March 14, 1959, declared: "There used to be very many

brigades for work in the fields. Since . . . the service is no longer quite free of charge, their number has . . . been reduced. The collectives have found out that it pays much better if they set to work themselves. Now they call for brigades only when it is really necessary."

Life in a Romanian Brigade

Youth brigades are often deployed to difficult and dreary work, which is made even more unpleasant by unhealthy living conditions. If the young people rebel against their lot, they are branded "bourgeois," "cowardly," etc. The Romanian youth publication *Scinteia Tineretului* (Bucharest), October 14, 1958, published what it regarded as evidence of the "Socialist dedication" of young people who were building dikes in Constanta, where voluntary labor saved the State two million lei.

"The brigades entered rush-covered huts which had been built that day. They soon went to bed. But there weren't enough beds. Some of the brigades put straw mattresses on the ground. . . . But the rain fell uninterruptedly. Water came through the roof. The brigadiers stood up and put the mattresses . . . over their heads, because the cold had their teeth chattering. The following morning . . . everyone was [nevertheless] present. The brigade assembled in complete discipline and went to the dike singing, like a company of soldiers. . . . Some of the brigadiers complained: they were convinced they were ill, but gradually they took themselves in hand and surmounted difficulties. . . . In this young and vigorous forest, however, there was also dead wood: Lucien Petre, who told everyone that it was impossible to exist in such a place and that it would be better to go home. He was judged severely by the other

Czech youngsters clearing an irrigation ditch at Mala Hana. The caption explains that machinery is expensive and scarce. Svet v Obrazech (Prague), November 21, 1959





Top: People in Czechoslovakia quarrying foundation stone for their own homes, an indirect way of recruiting "voluntary work." Bottom: A youth brigade in the cotton fields of a Bulgarian collective farm.

Kvety (Prague), July 2, 1959, and Bulgaria Today (Sofia), July 1959



Photo of a Bulgarian youth brigade in the village of Mikre, taken from a Romanian article entitled "Bulgarian Youth Begin a New Life."

Scinteia Tineretului (Bucharest), September 8, 1959

brigadiers, who decided to exclude him. . . . The cowardly, the timid and the lazy . . . do not belong in our ranks. We do not want dead wood among us."

The newspaper also described what happened when the head of the project singled out one of the brigades for not fulfilling its daily norm:

"'Why didn't you fulfill the norm? I want a brief answer.'

"One worker murmured that he had pains in his foot, another said he had pains in his hand, a third claimed that his shovel was broken. But the commander interrupted brusquely: 'That is not what I want to know. Tell me why you did not fulfill the norm.'"

This rebuke supposedly made the brigadiers ashamed of themselves and "they immediately returned to the dike, where they worked all night until they had over-fulfilled the norm. This was their answer." As a result of such tactics, work on the dike was finished 15 days earlier than scheduled, a fact which, *Scinteia Tineretului* declared, reflected well on youth, but most of all on the Party which had "inspired these people to such heroic deeds, illumined their faces, and inflamed this force which serves it with selfless devotion."

A POLISH EXPERIMENT

IN POLAND, WHERE THE Gomulka regime still tends to forego compulsory methods, youth brigades are less widespread than in other countries, and the approach appears to be more candid. Rather than rhapsodize about the militant dedication of youth, the press has taken a frank and realistic approach to the brigade program, pointing out contradictions, faults and failures.

The program was started in mid-1958 by the Communist Youth Union, ZMS, allegedly in response to a wave of unemployment caused by shifts in the economy. The ZMS embarked on a campaign to enlist young people between 18 and 24 (16- and 17-year-olds were also eligible if enrollment did not interfere with their education) for minimum work periods of two or three months. The recruits, called "junaks," were given uniforms and food allowances and guaranteed a base wage (originally between 20 and 30 *zloty* daily). The ZMS sought primarily young people who had lost their jobs, countryside youth with little professional training, and youngsters from towns and villages where jobs were hard to find. The new brigades were then sent to work in areas where, presumably, they were needed.

Putting the Kids to Work . . .

- Over 15,000 university students were expected to participate in the Bulgarian harvest. (Radio Sofia, October 2, 1959)
- During the summer of 1959, some 114 Bulgarian youth brigades were expected to work on terracing, 54 on afforestation and pasture clearing, 42 on construction and irrigation projects, 14 on improvement of towns and villages, and 109 in agricultural collectives and tractor stations. (Norodna Mladej [Sofia], April 24, 1959)
- About 200,000 Bulgarian youngsters participated in production and labor brigades in 1959. (Rabotnicesko Delo [Sofia], September 3, 1959)
- In the Cluj region, 1,920 Romanian youth brigades, comprising 67,000 youngsters, performed more than 2.5 million hours of work for an estimated saving of 7 million lei. In the Pitesti region, 1,777 brigades did 1.5 million hours of work for savings of over 4 million lei. (Radio Bucharest, September 7, 1959)
- An estimated 117,000 Polish Boy Scouts helped in the harvest. (PAP, June 25, 1959)
- Pupils in secondary schools in Budapest were assigned to manual work one day a week. "The project will be so organized as to be socially useful and closely tied in with the purposes of education and teaching." (Radio Budapest, February 10, 1959)
- In compensation for exemplary voluntary work, a number of youth groups were awarded honorary diplomas, 525 youngsters received prizes, and 110 youngsters were given free trips to the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. (Scinteia [Bucharest], February 27, 1959)
- Foreign students studying in Bucharest were said to have expressed the desire to participate in "voluntary labor." (Radio Bucharest, June 12, 1959)
- The Romanian youth paper insisted that labor brigades contribute to the education of youth, that discipline be maintained by organizing competitions among the brigades, and that the work performed by every youth be strictly recorded. (Scinteia Tinere-tului [Bucharest], June 24, 1959)

Fresh Sheets Every Ten Days

However well-intentioned, the program in 1958 was not a success. According to *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), July 27, 1958, the junaks sent to the mountain area of Bieszczady in southern Poland to help build a railroad were greeted with animosity and suspicion by the local labor force, which looked upon them as "rock-and-rollers, gum chewers," etc., resented their "being delivered from above" and objected to their privileged status. The local workers reportedly asked: "Why is it that the volunteers get fresh bed linen every ten days, while we have to sleep in dirt for months on end?" Furthermore, the productivity of many junaks was not up to par and was lower than that of seasonal workers: "Wages amount to 200 zloty for 13 hours of work! The value of the daily labors of some of the volunteers was barely 6 zloty—not even enough to pay for the cost of their food."

On February 13, 1959, *Trybuna Ludu* summed up the difficulties in 1958: too many adventurers had enrolled; inadequate preparations had been made for the program; and the enterprises themselves had not issued proper supplies so that the difficult living and working conditions disheartened many of the junaks who left before termina-

tion of the enlistment period. The Party paper reported that, because of these problems, the regime would go slower than it had originally intended in 1959. Although some 35,000 young workers had been requested by enterprises throughout the country, only 10,000 young people would be enrolled in regular brigades and 4,000 university students in seasonal vacation brigades. In addition, the size of the brigades would be reduced—the largest to number no more than 100-120 persons—and recruitment standards would be raised. Above all, *Trybuna Ludu* said, the brigades were not to be regarded as charity schools, rest camps or educational experiments with difficult youngsters, but as a means of helping young people to find jobs and fulfill economic tasks.

Went Over the Hill

By mid-1959, however, the experiment seemed no more successful than it had been the previous year. Enrollment was low (partly because local recruitment organs were negligent), and even after reducing the original quota of 10,000 recruits to 5,000-7,000, the ZMS was able to enlist only 3,000. All summer complaints came both from the enterprises and the junaks. The enterprises declared that

... and the Grownups

- In 1958, Prague citizens worked a total of 8,213,347 brigade hours. Of this total, 3,557,157 hours were devoted to Project Z for communal improvement, 91,898 hours to work in places with "supplementary budgets," 49,300 hours to creating sports facilities, 3,541,207 hours to agricultural brigades, 510 to hop picking and 463,653 to building. (*Narodni Vybery* [Prague], August 19, 1959)
- Last summer, 330,000 Bulgarians worked "voluntarily" for a total of 2 million days, thus saving the State over 30 million leva. (*Radio Sofia*, August 27, 1959)
- During 1958, the Hungarian people carried out "voluntary work" valued at 66 million forint. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], December 24, 1958)
- By September 27, 1959, people in Slovakia had performed 34,681,905 hours of unpaid brigade work. (*Lud* [Bratislava], September 27, 1959)
- In Poland, the value of "social pledges" in 1958 was 955 million zloty. Most of the effort went to building highways, schools, cultural houses and other local projects. State financing for the same projects amounted to only 183 million zloty. In 1959 the value of social pledges was to be 1.5 billion zloty, compared to 373 million in State help.
- The workers in the precision engineering department of the V. I. Lenin Plant in Plzen pledged, in honor of the tenth anniversary of Communist China, "to deliver the remaining 150-ton locomotives to China before the end of October. Thus, they will shorten their original pledge by two months." (*Radio Bratislava*, September 30, 1959)
- "Socialist competitions have become a method of management, since they affect all spheres of work in enterprises. Not only do they ensure plan fulfillment, but, by uncovering potentials, they enable the setting of higher plan targets." (*Prace* [Prague], October 6, 1959)
- "In some villages, efforts aimed at increasing local sources of energy are exaggerated, and, in some instances, unlawful commitments are extracted from the population. . . . Therefore, executive district councils should carefully examine the work and methods behind so-called voluntary pledges and should intervene with severity when exaggerated and unlawful demands are made. . . ." (*Bezpolitikai Szemle* [Budapest], October, 1959)

the junaks were unskilled, had to be educated on the job and created a myriad of problems; furthermore, according to a writer in *Polityka* (Warsaw), August 15, 1959, they lacked the ambition of family men and were satisfied just to be guaranteed a living as brigade members: "In Kolo-brzeg, it even came to the point where meals were denied those who loitered . . . and earned so little that their wages did not cover deductions for food."

The junaks, for their part, claimed that they were exploited. They said they were assigned the simplest jobs and therefore earned the lowest wages, and that the ZMS did not live up to its financial agreements. As a result, they deserted in droves:

"In Poznan, pinned to the wall in the brigade commandant's office, is a card reading: number of brigade members for July 29—68 junaks. 'Only yesterday, there were ten more,' the commandant says. And he adds, indicating a pile of dirty uniforms: 'These are their things. Three left on their own, the other seven I had to expel because the establishment representative told me they never wanted to see them again. It should be added that anyone wanting to leave the brigade is supposed to give 14 days notice, but no one ever adheres to these regulations. If someone is not released immediately after his first re-

quest, he proceeds to raise such a stink that they thank him for going.'" (*Polityka* [Warsaw], August 15, 1959.)

Investigating a complaint by junaks that they had received no wages in three months, *Zycie Warszawy* found that in one brigade the number of junaks had dropped from 230 on April 26 to 108 on July 20. The paper also discovered that, despite promises that monthly salaries would not drop below 900 zloty, in the month of June 51 junaks received less than 200, 65 received no money at all, and some did not even make enough to pay for food. Quoting the ZMS Central Committee, *Zycie Warszawy*, August 8, 1959, declared: "Confusion, carelessness, scandalous work organization, treatment of the junaks as a 'black labor mass'—that may very well be the sum total of all the above facts. And this . . . probably . . . is the main source of the low wages which, in turn, are frequently the direct cause of dissatisfaction, local 'riots,' 'poor work'. . . ."

THE HUNGARIAN "VOLUNTEERS"

IN HUNGARY, WHERE YOUTH brigades are more typical of those in Communist countries, reports on the establish-

ment of huge summer labor camps incline toward the ecstatic. The press expends great effort in waving away parents' fears for their children, in romanticizing the arduous task of land reclamation (to which the majority of the brigades are assigned) and in convincing everyone that brigade work is a sure cure for "hooliganism." The last notable attempt to deal realistically with the institution of summer brigade work was in 1957, when the pedagogical periodical *Köznevelés* (Budapest) did a survey on the subject. *Köznevelés* (November 15, 1957) found that the system had two chief drawbacks: students felt that the work was "forced on them and defended themselves against it with the most various pretexts"; and, more important, the earnings for collective work were much lower than for regular jobs. Thus, a student on his own hook might earn more than 1,500 forint during vacation while after two weeks of collective work earnings came to only 30-60 forint.

Disregarding these findings, the Kadar regime, in the summer of 1958, initiated unpaid Stalinist-type brigades. Masses of young people were sent to drain a large marsh in western Hungary (known as the Hanság), and others were put to work on dike building at Szigetköz. According to *Magyar Ifjúság* (Budapest), September 20, 1958, some 3,780 university and high school students worked on two-week shifts in "voluntary" camps, and nearly 8,000 young workers and peasants worked in the Hanság on Sundays. In 1959, under the leadership of the Communist youth union, KISZ, the movement was expanded. Some 10,000 students were scheduled to work in nine camps, two camps were established for girls, a recreational program was set up, and the participants were promised more free time and a six-hour work day. Since conditions were rugged, it was announced that only youths who had reached 16 and were in good physical health could enroll.

Glory in the Hanság

Throughout the spring and summer, propaganda extolling the work camps appeared in the press. *Nepszabadság* (Budapest), May 28, 1959, claimed that the hero of Hungarian youth was "the owner of the brigade flag and not the American teenager, the dangerous hooligan under twenty . . . the Western city girl wearing tight pants"; *Nepszava* (Budapest), July 1, 1959, assured parents that work in the camps was body-and-soul-building—it enabled boys to "settle down" and filled them with "serene joy"; other articles spoke of the importance of KISZ leadership and "educational" work in the camps; and on June 4, 1959, *Magyar Nemzet* declared that young people were flocking to the call of adventure. The newspaper said that at the Building Industry and Technical Transportation University, enrollments were four times higher than in the previous year and that applicants had to be turned away: "The head physician claimed that young people even denied that they were ill so that they could take part in the Hanság project." In fact, *Magyar Nemzet* added, the enrollments were proof that Hungarian youth was neither selfish, materialistic nor indifferent:

"Many youths are attracted by the romantic aspects

of the work awaiting them. In the virgin world of the marshes they will work in places where no man has ever been. The difficulties attract rather than frighten them. To shovel earth from under water is hard work. . . . There are also many mosquitoes. . . . Those leaving for the Badacsony can 'boast' that it will be even hard for them, working in the scorching sun on the stony soil of the mountainside."

On July 5, 1959, the same newspaper reported that the 5,000 youngsters sent to the Hanság had loved every minute of it. Interviewing one participant, who was planning to enter Budapest's Technical University, *Magyar Nemzet* managed to convey the "educational" benefits of such an experience. The student reported that reveille was blown at 4:30 a.m. and taps at 9 p.m., but that the cultural program often kept people up past 11:

"We don't sleep much. . . . Besides, there are few rubber boots, and the leather boots blister our feet. And there are loads of mosquitoes. That is one side of the coin.

"On the other hand, the three meals we get each day are nourishing and good. Today, for instance: broth and meat with sauce and dumplings. . . . The work is not easy, but nobody is overworked. . . . And after noon we can participate in sports and games as much as we like. . . . The loudspeaker plays good dance music all day long, we have a library and evening entertainment. . . . We have plenty of free time, mail comes daily, the majority of the boys are nice, ready to help friends. . . . I am not sorry that I volunteered for these two weeks; on the contrary, I am even glad. On the one hand, I have formed an idea of a construction laborer's work; on the other hand, perhaps some years from now I, as an engineer, may have to direct construction work here in the Hanság. And then nobody will be able to say that I hold a protractor better than a spade."

THE EXPANDING PATTERN

EVIDENTLY NOT EVERYONE is as sanguine about the benefits of voluntary work as the student quoted above, and much opposition has come from parents. In Czechoslovakia, for example, popular protests about brigade work and "polytechnical" training in the schools provoked the following statement by Politburo member J. Hendrych in a report to the Party Central Committee on April 22, 1959: "We must not be misled by objections that we want to turn our schools into labor institutions, to revive the system of child labor which, they say, was abolished in the name of humanitarianism a long time ago." Not only have the regimes not been "misled," they have continued to increase the work obligations of youth both during vacations and in the school year. In the summer of 1959, for instance, some 100,000 students were expected to work in Czechoslovak brigades (*Prace*, July 16). Medical students in Hradec Kralove worked over 13,000 hours constructing a wall panel factory; students at the Bratislava Technical Institute

worked for two months on a drainage canal; students at the School for Engineering Construction built a new Bratislava Zoo; and 11,000 high school students from Prague went to harvest hops—to cite only a few examples of youth's endeavors. (Radio Prague, September 3; *Rolnické Noviny* [Bratislava], August 5; *Praca* [Bratislava], September 1; *Prace* [Prague], August 14.)

According to the Romanian publication *Scinteia Tineretului*, October 15, 1959, over 850,000 boys and girls in 25,500 voluntary brigades had saved the State 44 million *lei* since the beginning of the year. By the end of the year, it was expected that more than one million youngsters would belong to the brigades, with each of them doing at least 100 hours of voluntary work. From these announcements, it is obvious that "savings from voluntary labor" in Romania and elsewhere in Eastern Europe are likely to increase enormously in 1960.

DEFINITION

"A [voluntary] brigade worker is a person whose activity in a given organized operation does not last more than six work days in succession or exceed six work days in the calendar month, and whose earnings from a given organized operation are less than 120 *koruny* for the calendar month. Similarly, brigade workers are those who carry out brigade activities without compensation . . . and also those who come from the ranks of school pupils or university students and participate collectively and in mass groups in a brigade operation which has been organized by the school authorities. . . ."

Lidova Demokracie (Prague), June 3, 1959

Stomma's Warning

AMONG ALL the official voices in Poland today calling for stricter "discipline" and for a return to Communist orthodoxy, at least one man has spoken up for democratization, self-government and "the climate of thaw." Stanislaw Stomma, Sejm (Parliament) deputy and leader of the group of Catholic parliamentarians known as *Znak*, addressed the Sejm on November 25; implicit in his words was a warning to the Gomulka regime that if it went too far in its drift toward the old methods of "administrative" rule it would have difficulties with the Polish people. The following excerpts from his speech were published in *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Cracow), December 6, 1959.

WHEN I SPOKE from this rostrum a year ago, I defended society. When I say 'society' I mean the millions of ordinary, average citizens. . . . We sometimes hear that this society has disappointed us. And some people explain by this fact the difficulties and failures which became apparent in implementing the political line of October [1956]. This reproach cannot be bypassed or ignored. There is a lot of bitter truth in it. These are true facts, worrying facts, but the point is not to draw false conclusions from them. If some propose that in this case we must return to administrative pressure—it would be a false conclusion.

"In the first place, it is true that Polish society is difficult to govern. It is difficult to govern the nation, but it is even more difficult to govern in spite of it and in collision with it.

"In the second place, it is true that society shows a lack of collective discipline, but it is equally true that it passed the test with flying colors during many a crucial moment; to name a few: the German occupation, or even the October 1956 events, when Polish society personified two such rarely encountered and even more rarely reconcilable characteristics as enthusiasm and discipline.

"And in the third place, the conclusion that after 1956

the people faltered in jumping the gun, to say the least. If, in our difficult situation, the collective effort does not correspond with the objective exigencies, this is not reason enough for us to close our eyes to the great progress achieved in many fields. The rapid economic development in the countryside is a case in point. And there are many more such examples. . . .

"There are two possible ways to govern. . . . Method one is with authoritarian government. Method two is making decisions on the basis of the nation, with the approval of the majority and by getting society to cooperate. This second method is a democratic one. Its consequence is self-government.

"Self-government is the basic and cardinal point of the program and on it are centered the hopes of the common man. . . . Everyone understands what important consequences follow the acceptance of the principles proposed here. This means that the nation must be taken into consideration; its beliefs, faith and traditions must be respected. This means a specific social climate. I would say a climate of thaw. And this climate is what the people of Poland really care about.

"We do not deny that an increase of discipline is indispensable. But the strengthening of discipline is not tantamount to departure from democratization. . . . Polish conditions being as they are, we are convinced that there is only one solution. The road leads only forward. It would be an illusion to believe that mechanical administrative rigor, under anti-democratic conditions and in the absence of a true concord with the people, could achieve any kind of positive results. Such a mechanical administrative rigor can only yield lifeless stagnation and a return to the past processes of social decay. Forward-looking economic policies can be fostered only with the support of the people. And this, in turn, demands that these people be taken into account in every field. It demands, as we said before, a general climate of thaw. . . .

(Continued on page 55)

*A Polish philosopher tangles with the
high priests of Communism.*

**"The
Priest
and the
Jester"**

LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, the brilliant young Polish Communist philosopher who has been engaged, since 1956, in a debate with the orthodoxies of "Marxism-Leninism," is again under attack. In 1957, Kolakowski had published a major work, "Responsibility and History," critical of some basic Communist dogmas (see *East Europe* December 1957 *et seq.*); this was severely attacked as "revisionist," but Kolakowski continued to hold the important post of editor-in-chief of the bi-monthly *Studia Filozoficzne* (*Philosophical Studies*).

In the March-April 1959 issue of this magazine, Kolakowski published a lecture he had delivered at the University of Tuebingen in West Germany, entitled "On Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth"; this was a comparison of the works of Marx's younger and later years, to the effect that certain "liberal" positions scorned by official doctrine were to be found in the younger Marx. Following the publication of this article, Kolakowski was dropped as editor-in-chief of the periodical, but he remained on the "editorial committee." Several months passed, however, before the article and its author were answered by Party spokesmen. Some of these attacks came at the Writers' Union Congress in December. The most thoroughgoing appeared in the December 1959 *Nowe Drogi*; it was by Adam Schaff, member of the Party's Central Committee, Director of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Science and possibly the regime's leading ideological spokesman. Schaff accused Kolakowski of revisionism and of distortion, of existentialism and of ignorance. He also uttered a warning to *Studia Filozoficzne* for publishing such material.

Very shortly thereafter Kolakowski again came under attack for another article: "The Priest and the Jester," published in *Twórczość*, October 1959. In this, Kolakowski ponders "whether history is heading toward some delineated direction that will assure final equality and total justice?" He goes on to criticize philosophical systems—including, or especially, Marxism—which begin their answers to such questions by "the establishment of a dogma." The priest of the title is the dogmatist; the jester is that spirit of critical inquiry corrosive of all dogma, Communist, religious or whatever. Following are selected passages from "The Priest and the Jester":

"Revelation is the eternal hope of philosophy. Thus we see that so-called philosophical 'systems,' which are supposed to provide us with certainty during the final stages of their investigation, actually do so right at the beginning: by force of an almost automatically accepted succession they begin with the establishment of confirmed knowledge, the absolute beginning of all reasoning. . . . Philosophy is the effort of ceaseless questioning of all that is obvious, therefore the constant disavowing of existing revelations; however, the temptation to possess one's own revelation is indefatigable in its attempts to ensnare the critical: every philosophy which has aspirations toward becoming a 'system' questions alien revelations only immediately to establish its own; there are very few methods of reasoning which fail silently to subscribe to the Thomist principle according to which the goal of every movement is rest. . . .

"The antagonism between the philosophy which establishes the absolute and the one which questions the accepted absolute appears to be incurable, as incurable as is the existence of conservatism and radicalism in all the aspects of human life. It is the antagonism of priest and jester, and in practically every historical epoch the philosophy of the priest and that of the jester are the two most common forms of intellectual culture. The priest is the guardian of the absolute, who upholds the cult in the name of the finalities and manifestations accepted and contained within tradition. The jester is the one who, although keeping good company, does not belong to it and makes it the object of his impertinences; the one who places under the light of doubt everything that passes as manifest. He could not do this if he were a member of that company—for then his status would be that of a drawing-room scandalizer, at most. . . . There can be no agreement between the priests and the jesters, unless as sometimes happens one becomes transformed into the other (it is more often that the jester turns into the priest—just as Socrates became Plato). The philosophy of the jester is that which in every era unmasks as doubtful what is considered immovable, reveals the contradictions of that which seems evident and incontestable, ridicules manifestations of common sense and perceives sense in absurdity—in other words, assumes all the daily tasks of the jester's profession, together with the unavoidable risk of appearing ludicrous. . . .

"At the royal palace there are more priests than jesters—just as in the king's realm there are more policemen than artists. It does not seem possible to be otherwise. The preponderance of mythology's adherents over its critics seems to be inevitable and normal: it is the preponderance of one world of fact over the manifold possible worlds, the preponderance of the facility of decline over the difficulties of soaring to the top. . . .

"We declare ourselves in favor of the philosophy of the jester, namely, the attitude of negative vigilance in the face of any kind of absolute."

Such an analysis and such a conclusion, of course, were anathema to orthodox Marxists. Jerzy Wiatr, for example, writing in *Polityka* (Warsaw), December 12, 1959, after an extensive defense of Marxism against the accusation of dogmatism, declared and warned: "It is easy to see that the attitude of general and complete negation must also encompass a negation of real, progressive achievements. In this sense, behind 'revolutionary' appearances, such a negation objectively favors conservative forces."



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EAST-WEST TRADE IN EUROPE



A previous article, on Eastern Europe's trade with Asia, Africa and Latin America, appeared in the December issue.

Communist Traders Look Abroad

WHEN STALIN DROPPED the iron curtain over Eastern Europe after World War II he cut a continent in half. The nations east of the curtain had been part of an economic society extending from Bucharest to London and from Athens to Oslo. For all their nationalism, they had lived upon each other's wares. The Westerners bought Hungary's grain, Bulgaria's fruit, Romania's oil, Poland's coal and ham, sending back the manufactures of Manchester and the Rhineland.

This economic web was broken in the late 1940s, and its loose strands were seized by the Russians. While before the war Western Europe had absorbed about 70 percent of Eastern Europe's exports, and accounted for more than 60 percent of its imports, by 1953 the proportions had fallen to less than 20 percent. Nearly half of Eastern Europe's exports went to the USSR that year.

Since Stalin's death, the commerce between East and West has crept upward again. It is now good Communist gospel to say—toward the end of a six-hour speech—that "we must increase our trade with capitalist countries also, but without exposing ourselves to the uncertainties of the capitalist market." Communist trade delegations are frequently seen these days in the capitals of Western Europe, and Western businessmen have shown some interest. Last September, for example, the Polish government contracted with a British firm for supplies of synthetic fiber, and for a license to produce that fiber in Poland by 1964. Hungary bought a complete chemical plant in France, and a cellulose plant in Britain. East Germany, during 1959, purchased \$5.5 million worth of British steel, and another \$1.7 million worth of chemicals, plastics, oil refinery equipment and paper-making machinery. West European bankers were recently reported to have offered long-term credits to Czechoslovakia for the purchase of machinery.

The commercial thaw raised Western Europe's trade with Eastern Europe by 91 percent between 1953 and 1958, although the level is still low by prewar standards. The Easterners are drawn by the manifest wealth and technological efficiency of the West, and also by the need for certain raw materials, food and consumer goods which are perennially scarce in the Communist lands. East-West commerce totalled about \$3.3 billion in 1958, not

counting trade between the separate parts of Germany. Poland topped the list, followed by Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary; Romania and Bulgaria accounted for only one-eighth of the total.

As part of the total foreign trade of advanced industrial countries like West Germany, Britain, and other European commercial powers, the intercourse with the Satellites is small; it amounts to about three percent of the trade of the 13 countries belonging to the Common Market and the Free Trade Association. For less developed countries such as Finland, Iceland, Turkey and Greece its importance is greater and the rate of increase has been faster.

The Struggle to Sell

Yet, on the whole, the Communist governments have not been very successful in promoting the kind of trade they need and want. In the first place, the old basis of East-West trade—food and raw materials in exchange for Western manufactures—no longer exists. The grain depots in London, Copenhagen and Amsterdam which formerly handled the East European grain trade were still there in the middle 1950s, but the Communist countries no longer had much grain to export. Communist economic policies, based upon the expansion of industry and the collectivization of agriculture, have eliminated the old grain surplus; now Eastern Europe has to import grain from the United States and Canada. Foodstuffs and raw materials are in short supply throughout the area because of growing industrial requirements and the necessity of feeding the new urban proletariat. The result has been a shift in the structure of East European exports.

Selling textiles, radios and machine tools in the competitive markets of the West is difficult even for established businessmen, but next to impossible for the new State traders of the East. Success depends on promptness, a quick grasp of opportunities, and adaptability to changing demand. The lumbering Communist monolith, with its rigid planning and its plethora of shoddy goods, has not yet made much impression on Western markets. The difficulty is compounded by the need to satisfy Soviet and Chinese demands for modern industrial equipment, leav-



Waterfront at the Polish port of Szczecin (formerly Stettin) at the mouth of the Oder River, an important trade and shipbuilding center.

Poland (Warsaw), No. 6, 1959

ing the Satellites with relatively little to sell elsewhere. Despite the radical increase in exports of East European manufactures during the 1950s, most of these go to the Sino-Soviet bloc.

The Satellites have tried to push sales of meat, poultry, dairy products and other special produce in place of scarce grain and unsalable machinery. In 1958, Poland expanded its sales of these items by 57 percent, and other East European countries achieved smaller increases. But recent shortages of meat throughout the bloc, allied to difficulties in stockbreeding and fodder production, have imposed serious limits to this approach. The USSR has been able to export fuels, timber, woodpulp and base metals to the West to obtain its hard currency, but the Satellites are lacking in these things and must themselves import them from the USSR.

Another difficulty in expanding trade with the West has been the primitive machinery of bilateral agreements through which the Communists carry on their commerce. This involves a complex net of agreements, linking two by two the countries involved in every exchange, providing for the kinds and quantities of goods to be traded and the means of financing the trade. Western businessmen are frequently discouraged by the difficulties which result from arbitrary changes in the terms of business, by the gratuitous interference of political considerations, and by the long dickering which often precedes an agreement. One of the greatest drawbacks is in the clearing of trade balances. The Communist countries have been known to use their trade deficits with the West to extract terms which they could not otherwise have obtained. For ex-

ample, in 1953 Italy paid \$110 per ton for Soviet wheat in order to reduce a Communist bloc trade deficit of \$8.8 million, despite the fact that American wheat was then priced at \$92 per ton. The Communists have tried to discourage Western European countries from clearing accounts with the bloc among themselves, a practice which would deprive the Communist merchants of a powerful bargaining weapon. They have also made it difficult to transfer a trade surplus from one Communist country to another.* Moreover, the Soviet bloc does not have a rational, internationally comparable set of prices which would eliminate the need for detailed negotiation on every price in every trade agreement.

The West has strengthened its bargaining position in recent years by its success in making currencies convertible and in liberalizing trade over wide areas—the crowning achievement being the establishment of the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association in 1959. As a result, Communist trade with Western Europe must be conducted in goods which meet Western standards and at prices more or less in line with those established on the world market. During the recent economic recession, the Communist countries had to adjust their export prices downward in line with the fall of commodity prices on the world market—notwithstanding their oft-repeated

* For example, if Norway wishes to use a surplus in its accounts with Hungary to purchase goods in Czechoslovakia, a whole new series of negotiations must take place: first Norway must negotiate with Czechoslovakia regarding the availability and prices of the products desired; and second, before Czechoslovakia can agree, it must negotiate with Hungary concerning the use of the additional credits to buy goods from Hungary.

claim that membership in the Soviet bloc protects a country from the vicissitudes of the capitalist market. The year 1958 was particularly bad for the East European countries, because the prices of the commodities they sold abroad fell much more than the prices of the manufactured goods they imported. For example, in 1957 Poland sold 6.4 million tons of coal to Western Europe, valued at \$143 million; in 1958 its coal sales rose to 7.8 million tons but their total value dropped to \$112 million.

THE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES

WEST GERMANY, FRANCE, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg—the countries of the European Economic Community—handled two-fifths of the East-West trade in 1958. If the commercial thaw continues, these countries are likely to absorb an even larger proportion of the trade in coming years.

West Germany—Food Importer

About 42 percent of the Common Market group's trade with the East was carried on by West Germany in 1958, when that country's trade with the Soviet bloc totalled \$562 million (not including trade with East Germany). German exports are typical of those from the

industrial West: iron and steel, chemicals, and special kinds of machinery and equipment. The Bonn government has encouraged imports of agricultural produce from the East, and even industrialized Czechoslovakia sends very little else. Polish and Hungarian efforts to recapture markets for their dwindling agricultural exports have met a favorable reception from the Germans. Bulgaria and Romania have found there the largest single market for their fruits and vegetables, grains and tobacco. The Sofia government claims that its trade with West Germany rose by 95 percent during 1959. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], December 24, 1959.)

Germany has also bought Polish coal and Romanian oil, but the demand for these has fallen lately. A glut of coal has forced the European Coal and Steel Community to cut imports from outside the Community almost in half; and at the end of 1959 the Bonn government, moved by the crisis in German coal mining, levied a duty of 20 marks per ton on imported coal.

France

In the slow expansion of trade since 1953, France has been one of Eastern Europe's first customers. In 1956 Poland purchased \$28 million worth of equipment for its chemical and electric power industries. Last year Hungary bought a complete chemical plant. Romania imports

EAST-WEST TRADE IN 1958

[Millions of Dollars]

	Eastern Europe	Soviet Union
West Germany ¹	398.3	164.2
France	148.4	170.4
Italy	116.3	70.9
Netherlands	77.4	51.8
Belgium-Luxem.	75.9	43.0
Austria	187.4	44.2
United Kingdom ²	180.9	232.9
Sweden	98.0	63.2
Switzerland	80.9	9.5
Denmark	71.1	29.6
Norway	46.0	33.7
Portugal	5.4	2.7
Yugoslavia	222.0	94.1
Finland	104.7	262.8
Turkey	99.7	29.8
Greece	46.2	31.1
Iceland	24.7	25.8
Spain	21.9	4.7
Ireland	6.1	0.5

Source: United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, (Geneva), September 1959.

¹ Total trade with Eastern Europe is 589.7 if East German trade is included.

² The United Kingdom's re-exports to Eastern Europe and the USSR are excluded.



Czechoslovakia has had some success in selling automobiles in Western Europe. Here, the TATRA 603 at the Brussels Fair in 1958.

Czechoslovak Foreign Trade (Prague), No. 3, 1958



Polish geese being fattened at a "goose factory" in Kielce. After slaughter, they are packed for export to Western Europe.


Poland (Warsaw), No. 4, 1959

equipment for its oil and chemical industries. Hungary has bought large quantities of grain, financed by loans of hard currency from the USSR. French-Soviet trade has exceeded that with the East European dependencies; in 1958, total trade with the whole Soviet bloc was \$319 million.

Italy and Benelux

Italy's trade with the USSR doubled in 1959, and is slated to grow another 40 percent in 1960. According to a recent trade agreement, the Soviets will send \$100 million worth of raw materials in return for machinery, textiles and synthetic fibers. Poland doubled its volume of coal sales in 1958, and increased its sales of foodstuffs, importing more than \$10 million worth of special machinery. For Romania and Bulgaria, Italy is second only to West Germany among the West European markets. Last summer the Romanian government, faced with a decline in its oil exports to Italy, sent its Minister of Oil to Rome for a long series of talks with trade officials and technicians of the Italian Institute of Hydrocarbons. Bulgaria, like Hungary, has concentrated on exporting agricultural produce; the government claimed to have doubled its trade with Italy in 1959.

Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have provided relatively favorable markets for Czechoslovak and East German manufactures, particularly materials for the chemical and machine industries, and synthetic fibers. Poland and Hungary have incurred trade deficits in their purchases of iron and steel, chemicals and synthetic fibers.



Part of an 84,000 kilowatt electric turbine built in Czechoslovakia, which specializes in the export of heavy mechanical equipment.

Czechoslovak Foreign Trade (Prague), No. 3, 1958

THE COUNTRIES OF THE "OUTER SEVEN"

WESTERN EUROPE'S SECOND trade group, comprising the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal, has shown relatively little increase in its total trade with the Soviet bloc since 1953. The chief reason for the slow growth of the Free Trade Association's turnover has been the poor market for imports of coal and foodstuffs from the East.

The United Kingdom—Pounds for Gold

Britain ranks among the top West European countries in trade with the East. The attraction of the British market stems not only from the fact that it is a major source of specialized machinery, but also from the role of the pound in world trade. For the latter reason the Soviet bloc has maintained large export surpluses in Britain; and the USSR has sold substantial amounts of gold in London.

As in France and West Germany, one of the major incentives is the need for specialized equipment, particularly in the chemical industry. Soviet orders for chemical equipment alone exceeded \$50 million in the first half of 1959. Last summer Hungary ordered a complete cellulose plant with an output of 20,000 tons annually and valued at approximately \$3 million; additional contracts were signed for a half million dollars worth of oil well equipment. During 1959, the East German regime entered the market heavily with purchases of some \$5.5 million worth of British steel and another \$1.7 million worth

of chemicals, plastics, oil-cracking installations and paper-making equipment.

As elsewhere in Western Europe during 1958, exports of specific commodities suffered from increased Western competition. East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the chief exporters of manufactured goods, were hit hardest; and Soviet exports of raw materials slumped with the general decline in demand for those products. In 1959 Poland encountered difficulties in maintaining its exports of meat to the United Kingdom, which had been a mainstay of Polish trade with the West and an important source of hard currency.

During the negotiations which led to the formation of the Free Trade Association, Britain agreed to reduce tariffs on bacon from Denmark (which already supplied 40 percent of the British bacon imports in comparison with Poland's 9 percent). The British also started to import bacon from Canada. In December 1959, when Polish negotiators went to London to discuss renewal of the three-year trade agreement with Britain, the British were reported to have asked for a substantial cut in the Polish bacon quota. Poland responded by postponing further discussions until mid-1960.

EXPORTS TO WESTERN EUROPE

[Millions of Dollars]

	1953	1955	1956	1957	1958
Poland	235	268	328	312	361
Czechoslovakia	138	204	248	268	249
East Germany	84	134	140	147	165
Hungary	45	104	124	112	146
Romania	49	96	92	88	96
Bulgaria	25	22	32	40	46
Eastern Europe	576	828	964	967	1063
Soviet Union	334	537	668	868	788

Source: United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, (Geneva), No. 2, 1955-59. Western European statistics are used. Values are c. i. f.

IMPORTS FROM WESTERN EUROPE

[Millions of Dollars]

	1953	1955	1956	1957	1958
Poland	154	200	264	284	319
Czechoslovakia	84	140	176	224	231
East Germany	93	130	136	148	166
Hungary	68	156	120	136	125
Romania	56	56	56	72	68
Bulgaria	23	20	31	44	40
Eastern Europe	478	702	783	908	949
Soviet Union	311	400	536	623	565

Source: United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, (Geneva), No. 2, 1955-59. Western European statistics are used. Values are f. o. b.

Romania's trade with the United Kingdom has suffered from the fact that, unlike the other East European countries, it has not yet settled the compensation claims arising from nationalization of British property. In 1959 Bucharest offered to purchase industrial equipment valued at 20 million pounds, including a textile mill, a coking plant, electric locomotives and chemical equipment. The purchases were to be paid for with products of the Romanian oil industry, but this is the very industry where British claims are highest. The offer was not considered acceptable in London.

Setbacks in Scandinavia

Sweden and Norway are switching from coal to liquid fuels, and the impact of this structural change has fallen heavily upon the traditional imports of coal from Poland. In order to pay for its purchases of Scandinavian iron ore, Poland has sought to export more metallurgical products in place of coal, but has not been notably successful thus far. Czechoslovakia and East Germany have encountered difficulties in expanding their Scandinavian trade sufficiently to cover their growing import requirements, but in 1958 and 1959 they managed to increase their sales of machinery and chemicals. East Germany has scheduled an increase in the sale of steel products to Sweden in 1960. Hungary's trade with Norway and Sweden has been small; recently, in hope of importing Swedish industrial plants and technology, the Hungarians have been giving special attention to their trade with that country, and the best show rooms in Stockholm are filled with Hungarian electrical equipment. Romania, which signed its first trade agreement with Sweden in August 1959, intends to take advantage of the very situation which has brought difficulty to Poland; it will sell oil to Sweden with an eye to importing complete Swedish industrial plants and the technical expertise which accompanies them.

Denmark's trade with the bloc has also tended to stagnate in recent years, despite increased Danish exports of meat and dairy products to Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Increased imports of Polish coal in 1958 helped to finance \$10.5 million worth of Danish machinery exports, particularly motors for the Polish shipbuilding industry. Trade between Denmark and other East European countries is minimal.

The Continental "Neutrals"

Austria and Switzerland have more lively relations with the Communist bloc than do their northern associates in the new free trade group. Since the 1955 Peace Treaty, Austria has maintained a high volume of trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The percentage of total Austrian trade conducted with the bloc is the highest in either trade group in Western Europe: 10.8 percent of imports and 12.4 percent of exports during 1958.*

* Reparations payments to the Soviet Union are excluded. Deliveries under the State Treaty amounted to \$42.5 million in 1957 and \$41.5 million in 1958. Exports to the Soviet Union were \$27.4 and \$20.2 million while imports were \$21.4 and \$21.9 million in the respective years. United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, September, 1959, p. 32.

Partly as a result of the large reparations bill to the USSR, Austria built up exports of steel, machinery and equipment; trade with the bloc is now similar to that of West Germany, France and Great Britain. Polish coal exports to Austria, which in the past made up nearly 90 percent of Polish sales, were slated to increase during 1959 by 15 percent, as a result of a five-year agreement concluded with the Austrian railways; but Polish coal sales had plunged 22 percent during 1958. Polish agricultural exports have been underbid by neighboring Hungary, for which the importance of the Austrian market is exceeded only by that of West Germany's. The trade agreement for 1960 calls for a 20 percent increase in Austro-Hungarian trade.

Switzerland's trade with the Communist bloc is much less important. Swiss exports consist principally of manufactured goods, including some machinery. The major bloc trader is Czechoslovakia.

COUNTRIES OF THE "FRINGE"

THE SOVIET BLOC's most dynamic commercial ties with Western Europe in recent years have been with those countries which have not attached themselves to either of the two big trade groups. The share of these countries in East-West trade rose from 11 to 27 percent between 1950 and 1958; if Finland is excluded the growth is even more remarkable. The share taken by the Soviet bloc in the trade of each of these countries is as follows (excluding Finnish reparations to the USSR):*

	Exports		Imports	
	1953	1958	1953	1958
Iceland	19.9	34.0	8.5	32.0
Yugoslavia	—	28.0	—	28.4
Finland	30.4	23.8	34.1	25.1
Turkey	7.4	23.6	5.5	18.2
Greece	6.3	16.3	1.3	7.0
Spain	—	2.0	—	2.0
Ireland	0.1	0.3	0.4	1.1

The countries of this group have certain incentives in common with the East European countries: both groups need an economic shield against the competition of more developed industrial countries; and both need commercial outlets to compensate for their relatively weak bargaining power in the markets of Western Europe. Much of the trade amounts to an exchange of East European manufactured products, which are difficult to sell in the more industrialized countries of Western Europe, for surplus food and raw materials from the "fringe" countries. Most of Hungary's exports of manufactured goods outside the Soviet bloc go to the fringe countries. Four-fifths of Czechoslovak and East German exports to these countries consist of machinery and manufactured consumer goods.

* United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, September 1959.

Trouble with Helsinki

"If Westerners are really concerned about Finland's position, why don't they do something about it by buying more Finnish goods?" This question, recently asked by a Finnish leader, expressed Finland's desire to break the hold which the Soviet bloc has on its trade. The dependency is an outgrowth of war reparations payments to the Soviet Union, which forced Finland to build or expand high-cost metallurgical, machine and shipbuilding industries. Tucked away in the northern hinterlands of Europe and supporting their high-cost production with an overvalued currency, the Finns simply could not obtain prices in Western European markets high enough to cover the costs of production. Increasingly, trade was directed toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Before 1950, exports to the USSR—excluding reparations payments—outran imports to such an extent that a triangular scheme of balancing trade with excess imports from the East European countries was introduced. Export surpluses still persisted, however, forcing Finland to accept unwanted goods, such as wheat, from the Soviet Union and re-export them to Western Europe at a loss. But in 1957 the East European countries showed some independence and defected from the arrangement. First Czechoslovakia, and later Poland, Romania, East Germany and Hungary insisted on hard cash for their excess goods. Poland demanded payment in pounds sterling. In September, 1957, Finland devalued its currency and liberalized restrictions discriminating against West European goods. The result: Finland's purchases of manufactured goods, which came primarily from Eastern Europe, fell 50 percent during 1958; and total imports from both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union dropped by 30 percent. The largest contraction was in trade with Czechoslovakia, whose exports to Finland fell over 70 percent from the 1957 level.

A political crisis in 1958 resulted in the temporary withdrawal of the Soviet ambassador. Under pressure from Moscow the Finns were forced to compromise and the crisis subsided in December, 1958, when a long-term trade agreement was signed with the Soviet Union. Trade with Eastern Europe was stabilized during the first half of 1959 but on a lower level, and now presumably within a bilateral structure. An agreement signed with Czechoslovakia in February, 1959, set targets 41 percent below those of 1957. (Finland had repudiated the previous agreement in September, 1958.)

Finland's relation to the European Free Trade Association (with which 30 percent of its trade is conducted) is still uncertain. Finland recently made a formal bid to the Association requesting that trade advantages be granted without the requirement of full membership. (*The New York Times*, November 2, 1959.) The USSR showed no objection to this move by the Finns. Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, while visiting Helsinki, made plain his dislike for all such Western groupings but noted that "ways of giving Finnish goods free trade treatment without an institutional tie-up can be devised." This attitude, however, was less an indication of sympathy for

DISTRIBUTION OF TRADE WITH WESTERN EUROPE

[Percentage of Total Trade]

	1950	1952	1955	1957	1958
EASTERN EUROPE					
Common Market ¹	39	35	36	39	41
United Kingdom	11	9	10	9	8
Other EFTA ²	39	43	28	27	24
Finland	6	9	11	9	5
Rest of Europe ³	5	4	15	16	22
USSR					
Common Market	24	22	30	31	37
United Kingdom	41	27	26	21	17
Other EFTA	19	19	13	13	14
Finland	16	31	24	22	19
Rest of Europe	—	1	7	13	13

Sources: Computed from United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, (Geneva), No. 2, 1955-59.

¹ Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Italy, Netherlands, West Germany.

² Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland.

³ Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia.

Finland's economic plight than a harbinger of the subsequent Soviet demand for precisely the same status. (*The New York Times*, December 15, 1959.) Finland's determination to move closer to the countries of the Free Trade Association was pointedly expressed late last year by a Finnish paper manufacturer, who said: "Russians or no Russians, our Government simply has to get Finland in." (*The New York Times*, December 25, 1959.)

The Southerners—Reluctant Customers

The three Balkan states—Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece—are getting an increasing share of the trade with the Soviet bloc. Yugoslav trade, because of Yugoslavia's special position as a Communist country and a former member of the Soviet bloc, has waxed and waned with the political winds. In 1958, it rose to a record \$318 million, 80 percent of which was with the dependent countries of Eastern Europe. The chill which came over Moscow-Belgrade relations during that year did not immediately affect trade with Eastern Europe, for which the Yugoslav market was only slightly less important than that of Great Britain. During the first half of 1959, however, exports to Yugoslavia sharply contracted, a reflection of the delay in providing the credits which had previously been promised. Although Czechoslovakia had signed an agreement in February in which trade targets were raised, Belgrade recalled its delegation from Prague in July because the Czechs would not extend the time limit on credits granted in 1956, according to the Yugoslav official news service (July 3, 1959).

The greatest difficulties in Yugoslav trade relations have always been with the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1955, with the extension of a large line of Soviet credit,

the pace of commerce quickened, but in 1958 the unused portions of these credits were cancelled and exchange with the USSR fell considerably. Even the cautious thaw of 1959, which brought a new round of long-term agreements with most of the countries of Eastern Europe and provided for big increases in commercial relations over the next three-to-five years, still left Soviet trade on the problematic list. East Germany has been especially active in Yugoslavia recently; exports were expanded during 1958 to almost four times the 1957 level. The first official trade agreement was signed in April, 1959, placing commerce between the two countries on a long-term basis. Neighboring Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have also pushed into the Yugoslav market with great zeal. Most of the Hungarian machinery and equipment shipped outside the bloc travels south to Yugoslavia. Smaller quantities of goods from Bulgaria and Romania, including Romanian oil and foodstuffs and manufactured products from Bulgaria, are exchanged for Yugoslav chemicals and crude materials.

The high proportion of Turkish and Greek trade which is conducted with the Communist bloc results from the chronic imbalance in the trade of those countries with Western Europe. While geographically located in a position which offers natural trading advantages with the bloc, an additional factor has been their difficulty in selling goods to the industrial countries of Western Europe. In the case of Turkey, encouraged to trade extensively with the Soviet bloc by credits from the USSR and some of the East European regimes (see *East Europe*, December, 1959, p. 27), an inability to sell agricultural products has even adversely affected trade with Eastern Europe. A unique situation for a Western country trading with Communist countries was created in 1958 when Turkey was obliged to halve its imports from Czechoslovakia because of payment difficulties. During 1957 Czechoslovak exports to the Turkish market had risen to \$24 million, making Turkey the third most important trading partner for the Czechs in non-Communist Europe. In 1958 East Germany took the place of Czechoslovakia.

Neither Turkey nor Greece is complacent about the size of the trade which necessity has forced them to carry on with the Communists. Since the signing of the Rome Treaty in December 1958, both countries have sought admittance to the Common Market. Difficulties in establishing an agricultural policy under the Rome Treaty, however, have so far arrested the Greek and Turkish overtures. Trade agreements for 1960, which schedule even greater dependence on the East European market, underline the problem.*

Iceland

Like other underdeveloped countries with which the Communists have expanded trade, Iceland is tied to one commodity: fish. The instability which is common for a one-product economy is compounded in Iceland's case,

* United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, September 1959.

because fish does not even have the security of a world market price. Thus Iceland has welcomed the long-term agreements with the Soviet bloc which fix prices; the present trend is toward even greater trade with the Communist regimes. The latest trade agreement with Czechoslovakia, for example, calls for an 18 percent increase in trade during 1960.

WHICH WAY NOW?

THE REVIVAL OF COMMERCE between the sundered parts of Europe has far to go before it engages either side very heavily. Politics aside, the future will depend on what happens in three areas of economic policy: the new trading groups in both East and West (the Common Market, the Free Trade Association, and the Soviet-sponsored Comecon); the goods available for trading; and the manner in which the Communists do business.

The gradual reduction of tariffs within the Common Market and the Free Trade Association—and possibly between the two groups—will make it more difficult for Communist exporters to sell to those countries. Most immediately affected will be East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which deal most heavily in manufactured products. Whether raw materials and foodstuffs encounter similar obstacles will depend on the agricultural policies adopted by the Six and the Seven, although Poland has already encountered difficulty in selling bacon to Britain.

If the economic integration of Western Europe spurs industrial growth to the degree that some enthusiasts predict, then Western businessmen may press for concessions

to the Soviet bloc in order to sell their wares. But the Communists read the future darkly, to judge from the anathema they have delivered upon every move toward integration in the West.

Their own integration efforts in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance are, of course, a different matter. The Hungarian newspaper *Nepszabadsag* said on December 18: "It is obvious that if we had to meet our requirements for industrial raw materials by importing from the capitalist countries, we should be at the mercy of the anarchic capitalist market and should certainly not be able to carry on our planned economy very effectively." Current planning in Eastern Europe calls for the long-range expansion of foreign trade, but allots a progressively smaller share of it to the "capitalist" countries.

While the Communists have sought in various ways to improve their trading techniques, there is no sign that they are willing—or able—to base their trade on multilateral exchange. Apparently they will continue to deal with non-Communist countries by the same crude barter methods they have used until now, except for the occasional instance when they are willing to support a trade deficit with hard currency.

The fact remains that as long as the industrialization drive continues in Eastern Europe, its directors will hunger for the machines and technology of the West. Their trade delegations will go in greater numbers to the Western capitals than ever before, and their comparison-shoppers will prowl the international trade fairs. The chief difficulty is that, in the years immediately ahead, their eyes will be larger than their purses.

Packing grapes at a Bulgarian collective farm. Grapes used to be exported to Western Europe, but now they go to the Soviet Union.

Bulgaria Today (Sofia), December 1958





Smuggling

A Look At A Lifeline

A WESTERN OBSERVER has described prewar Poland as "a capitalist country without capital" and Poland today as a "Socialist country with a dual economy in which the State robs the citizen and the citizen robs the State." This description of prewar days could apply to all the Soviet bloc countries with the exceptions of East Germany and Czechoslovakia; without exception, the latter part of the definition fits any Satellite State. The war against the "pilferers of the people's property" is unceasing; week after week the regime press lists trials involving stiff sentences for thieving managers of enterprises, directors of State farms and the like. For those in lesser positions thievery can become a way of life; choked by a huge, inefficient bureaucracy, with stiff "norms" to fulfill, with prices high and wages low, the average worker finds it impossible to live by his salary alone. Such a situation inevitably leads to "moonlighting"—whether this involves tending a tiny plot of private property or holding another job after a full day's work—or crime. Poland, for example, admitted that during 1959, 120,000 cases of embezzlement or thefts were uncovered; the real figure is doubtless a good deal higher. In an economy rigged against the consumer, cynicism and opportunism often result.


Smuggling, unlike other types of fraud, is not frequently discussed in the regime press. Although crimes involving smuggling are not as widespread as embezzlement, theft or

other fraudulent activities, it is also true that cases of smuggling which have been reported have usually involved ordinary citizens whereas most reported cases of embezzlement serve as an excuse to berate a traitorous managerial class, and recall others who might be so tempted to their sense of duty. Since the worker is—in the myths of agit-prop—the prime recipient of Communist largess, it would hardly do for him to be revealed as a smuggler.

Yet Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland do report in their newspapers instances of contraband. Although smuggling goes on in the other Satellites as well, it is probably less common, since their frontiers are so far distant from the Western nations. Then, too, the regime press in those countries is less likely to publish such stories unless the illicit traffic becomes so prevalent that the populace needs a stiff warning.

Smuggling by Athletes

Although contacts outside the Soviet bloc have been increasing, this is a recent development. Before 1956 few East Europeans were permitted to travel to Western countries. During this period, with the exception of official delegations, those who were most frequently in contact with the West were athletes. Public castigation of athletes involved in smuggling has been a policy of the Satellite press; these



The wandering citizens of "People's Poland" are notorious in their hunger for the good things of foreign lands. These are travelers returning from (left to right) Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Italy, the USA, the Soviet Union, a Polish summer resort, Switzerland and France.

Szpilki (Warsaw), August 3, 1958

paragons of "Socialist" dynamism, on State-sponsored tours, have been held up, like the embezzler of the State farm, as the worst offenders. At times, the trial of an athlete for smuggling has proved a national embarrassment, as in the case of Julius Grosics, the world-famous Hungarian soccer player, who was sentenced in 1955 to one year of imprisonment.

This punishment was to serve as a warning to wayward musclemen. It failed, however; in 1958 a water polo player, Gyorgy Karpati, was caught selling 300 watches he had smuggled from Austria.

An article in the Party organ *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), December 8, 1957, gave evidence of regime indignation, although it tempered its criticism by depicting the athlete as a babe in the woods surrounded by evil tempters:

"In the past weeks and days, we have heard again that our customs authorities were compelled to take steps against athletes . . . coming back from foreign tours and competitions. In sporting circles . . . these cases are discussed almost always with exaggeration, indignation and feigned offense [referring to] the rudeness of a customs official. What is the truth? It's not a question of rudeness or discourtesy. But we must face the fact that smugglers, foreign currency dealers and speculators (who in most cases come from among the defectors) consider sports as their hunting grounds and want to use as instruments the young, inexperienced and easily baited athletes. They veritably besieged our competitors traveling abroad in order to help them take care of their 'affairs' (read: smuggled goods). Therefore, our customs officials, who are perhaps not very polite but certainly not credulous, find it hard to accept the fact that, for example, 150 pairs of nylon stockings belong to an athlete's wardrobe . . . or the habit of another athlete who carries his wrist watches (a few dozen) sewn into the lining of his overcoat. It is also not absolutely

necessary that someone supply himself with razor blades for several decades. Often they compete with the National Bank in the exchange of Hungarian for foreign currency."

Significantly, two items mentioned above were nylon stockings and wristwatches. These so-called "luxury goods" appear to be among the most desired in the Soviet bloc countries (as well as the easiest to conceal). Although the consumer goods situation has improved somewhat in recent years, luxury items smuggled into the black market can command high prices. Jewels and foreign currency are also at a premium; they can be hidden or transported easily and offer a fragment of personal and economic security denied the citizens of a Satellite State. Furthermore, in the event of emigration or escape to the West, they would be negotiable on Western markets.

Like Hungary, Czechoslovakia has its share of wayward athletes. The proximity to Austria and the frequency of athletic competitions between Czechoslovakia and that country have resulted in a flourishing commerce.

"The [Czechoslovak] cyclist Ladislav Foucek made the acquaintance of his Austrian colleague, Wimmer, at the international meet in 1955. He liked Wimmer's watch. Business developed with the help of Mrs. S. from Vienna, who smuggled watches and razors to Foucek, who, in turn, sold the items at a good profit. The quantities were in the hundreds. When the Vienna races were held in 1956, a Czechoslovak colleague, Nouza, joined the team, and others, Austrians and Czechs, were recruited. The matter ended before the bench of the criminal court . . . Nouza's sentence was 18 months; another civilian defendant got one year. Foucek . . . who was tried by a military court, received four years and was fined 18,000 *koruny*." (*Vecerni Praha* [Prague], November 22, 1957.)

In Poland, where tourism now is common, athlete-smugglers have fallen to second place, according to *Trybuna*



Nothing to Declare

"Trains carrying passengers traveling to or from the Soviet Union, Mongolia, China and Korea stop at the border station of Terespol practically every hour of the day. When trains traveling in opposite directions meet at the station, the railroad platform becomes a place for the exchange of impressions or advice for the trip ahead.

"Before the WOP [Border Patrol Units] soldiers shut the train doors, the compartments are visited by customs inspectors. The hand is raised to the visored cap and . . .

"'Terespol customs inspection . . . please show your passport and customs declaration.'

"There are no problems if the passenger explains that his box contains, for instance, toilet articles and a bottle . . . a revivifying drink. The situation worsens if his voice begins to falter. The customs inspectors know this moment well. They can be sure then that they'll get 'results.'

"The 'results' vary. 36 meters of woven material, a number of which were concealed upon the person of the smuggler, 86 pairs of Soviet-made stockings, 26 ladies' lingerie sets and 18.5 meters of dress material, 60 meters of textile materials, 9 meters of velvet and a set of dishes for 6. Such examples could be cited without end.

Luda (Warsaw), July 31, 1958, which listed people on organized trips operated by the official Polish tourist agency *Orbis* in first place as the greatest offenders, followed by various sports groups, and finally, individual tourists. "The least trouble is caused by student and youth groups going abroad," it proudly declared. It seems unlikely that the ingenious methods athletes use for smuggling are easily imitated. The Polish Party organ, September 1, 1959, in a round-up of smuggling activities over a three-month period, reported the following incidents:

"A former record-breaking Polish athlete, returning from Hamburg, was caught in an attempt to smuggle into the country 24 sets of ball-point pens, 1,900 razor blades, 45 silk kerchiefs, and 5 wrist watches concealed on . . . his legs. Two other [athletes] tried to smuggle in . . . a knitting machine, worth 15,000 *zloty*, and 3,700 razor blades."

"A swimming star who was smuggling gloves which she hid under her girdle and brassiere. . . . A boxer who attempted to bring into the country illegally 2 leather coats, one fur coat and a taxi-meter valued at 20,000 *zloty*. . . . A group of cyclists tried to smuggle into Poland approximately 400,000 *zloty* worth of goods."

Smuggling by Tourists

AN IMPORTANT dividend of the Khrushchev era has been the upswing in tourism in Eastern Europe. Although East-West contacts form part of the recent Soviet program of "peaceful coexistence," the hard currency of the West is also a major objective. Both incoming and outgoing traffic has risen in every Soviet bloc country since 1955 (with the exception of Hungary in 1957, the year after the Uprising). While the former group has been consistently larger than the latter, Czechoslovakia and Poland allowed over 250,000 tourists to go abroad in 1958; "abroad" in this context usually meant to other Communist countries. By contrast, only 6,000 Bulgarians travelled abroad in 1958, although 95,000 foreign tourists entered Bulgaria. Even fewer Romanians were permitted to leave the country during this same period.

Because of the demand for consumer goods in the Soviet

bloc, goods purchased in the West by a tourist can be sold at a considerable profit in Eastern Europe. For example, a French woman buying an inexpensive dress in Paris for 10 dollars could sell the same dress in Budapest for 47 dollars. The same dress might then be resold for 110 dollars. Not only does this brand of smuggling yield high profits, but the State suffers a loss of revenue on customs duties.

There is no doubt that smuggling by tourists is growing. According to the Polish Party organ, statistics for the first quarter of 1958 were as follows: "If we take the year 1953 as equalling 100, then the index for these crimes climbed to 141 in 1957 and 243 during the first three months of 1958." The journal went on to illustrate the scope of such activities by citing a report from the border station of Zebrzydowice on the Czechoslovak frontier: "According to the Zebrzydowice customs officials. . . . In 1957, the customs office prosecuted 112 criminal cases; in the first half of 1958, 156 such cases came up." (*Trybuna Luda*, July 31, 1958.)

Tourism in Eastern Europe falls into two categories: travel within the Communist bloc and travel to the West. The cost of travel West is often borne by the family abroad or organization sponsoring the trip, and customs control on Poland's western border, for example, is fairly relaxed. Travelers to the USSR and the Satellite countries are often carefully scrutinized, but the financial rewards for would-be smugglers on this circuit are potentially greater. The technique used by a Polish traveler to the Soviet Union can be summarized as follows:

In order to make the trip pay for itself, 10,000-20,000 *zloty* are needed; between 20,000 and 30,000 *zloty* are required if the capital is to yield a 100 percent profit through various trade transactions. For veteran smugglers, frequent trips to the USSR are obtained by staying only 10 days, at which time the "vacation" is interrupted by a telegram from a sick relative recalling the visitor to Poland. On this basis, a short time later the same person can receive another visa to enter the USSR. During these 10 days, all business matters must be settled. Polish fabrics are greatly in demand in the Soviet Union, while Russian rugs

"Sometimes the things that happen are described as unusual even by the customs inspectors. It was in Terespol that the authorities discovered half a kilogram of platinum, cunningly hidden—in the form of small tablets—in match boxes and in the motor of an electric washing machine. The platinum went to the State Treasury and its erstwhile owner to the jug. Also in Terespol, it was discovered that two engineers—miner and technician, returning from an official trip—were attempting to smuggle into the country a number of silver fox tails inside a fur coat hanging on a hanger. A more detailed inspection revealed a sack full of fur coats, leather and fur collars. A personal search of the technician resulted in the discovery in his sock of the following items: gold chain, gold bracelet and 22 gold bands.

"An employee of the Industrial Construction Enterprise did not do so badly either. On August 22, 1959 he attempted to smuggle from the USSR into Poland the following items among others: 240 metal false teeth, a massage machine, two electric motors, 15 perfume sprayers, 300 electric dental drill needles, 18 pairs of stockings, 87 bottles of flower-scented cologne, 12 bottles of perfume. . . . The complete list included a total of 25 items. Mr. Engineer tried to remedy the situation. He handed the customs inspector a gold band. The latter immediately presented it to his superior as tangible evidence. Seeing this, the engineer handed him another gold band. Thus, charges of smuggling will be accompanied by charges of bribery and undoubtedly confiscation of the goods in question." (*Kurier Polski*, [Warsaw], September 17, 1959.)

and tapestries are popular in the Poland. Other items much sought after in Poland are Soviet-made television sets, cameras and furs.

"Improper behavior" on the part of Polish tourists visiting the West was reported in *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), October 15, 1958. In answer to the question, "How to curtail trade during *Orbis*-sponsored excursions?" the journal urged greater surveillance by *Orbis* personnel over the tourists in their charge:

"In theory, the *Orbis* trips are of a tourist nature. . . . Exclusively tourist. . . . Why then isn't every member required to sign, prior to his departure from the country, an appropriate affidavit stating that he will conduct himself, while abroad, according to the rules and regulations, and that he agrees—under threat of severe penalty—to resist any and all temptations to trade? . . . The guilty could be dealt with in many ways, beginning with the inclusion of their names on a 'black list' and ending with their publication in the newspapers. . . .

"That is one side of the coin. And now the other. It is my opinion that the *Orbis* Agency itself inadvertently facilitates the activities of these smugglers and tradesmen. In what manner? In the manner by which the *Orbis* trips are becoming less tourist excursions than just a means of transportation for a certain number of people to foreign countries, and once there, simply turning them out to pasture. . . .

"Regarding sight-seeing, the tourists reply: we don't want it. They resist sight-seeing with all their might, and would rather have that 'free time.' Actually, this isn't quite true. It is not the tourists but the peddlers . . . who confine themselves to numerous expeditions throughout the business districts of Brussels and Antwerp. . . . As for the tours themselves, they are being conducted for the most part by dilettantes who have absolutely no knowledge of how tourism should be run."


The Communist regimes have not shut their eyes to the obvious root cause of smuggling by tourists: the failure of their consumer industries to provide goods in quantity and of reasonably decent quality. In 1956, the first year

when a considerable increase in tourism was permitted, the Slovak daily paper *Praca* (Bratislava), September 16, 1956, admitted that if consumer goods displayed abroad were provided at home, "this would be the best method of quelling the inclination to trade which every individual possesses. Certainly this would be a better way than the newest customs questionnaires which compel the tourist to list by item the contents of his whole suitcase when he crosses the border."



Czechoslovak border guards.

Zivot (Bratislava), April 9, 1959



A Czechoslovak police boat on the Danube.

Zivot (Bratislava), April 9, 1959

Smuggling Within the Bloc

Although official delegations and tourists are the groups most often engaged in illicit trade, minorities in border regions have also been cited for engaging in illegal trade. This is particularly true in the Ostrava-Karvina region of Czechoslovakia where approximately 80,000 people of Polish descent live and work; still other Poles work in Czechoslovakia during the day and return to their homes across the border at night. The more affluent Czechoslovak economy offers many opportunities to obtain goods at cheaper prices than in Poland; on the other hand, the greater freedom of the Polish peasant makes it possible to sell Polish bacon on the Czechoslovak black market. Since it is unlikely that the border will be closed in those areas where foreign employment is necessary, gangs of Polish and Czechoslovak smugglers can be organized on a semi-permanent basis, and the Ostrava daily *Nova Svoboda*, November 27, 1958, reported that a gang of seven smugglers, five Czechoslovaks and two Poles, extended their operations throughout the two countries, with two agents who lived near the border to take the goods across.

Smuggling has also been reported among members of the Polish Navy. Merchandise valued at approximately 1.5 million zloty was apprehended in the port of Gdansk when the merchant vessel *Wroclaw* arrived from the West German port of Hamburg. (*Trybuna Ludu*, July 30, 1959.)

In the foreseeable future, it is likely that smuggling will, if anything, increase. Although the Stalinist economics of

developing heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods has been mitigated since 1956, none of the Satellite nations (with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia and East Germany) will be in a position to provide the population with more than a very limited supply of non-essential goods. At the same time, East-West exchanges will probably continue, allowing an ever greater number of tourists and official delegations to exercise their individual initiative in obtaining amenities for personal use and for resale on the black market. It seems unlikely that this sector of East European private initiative will decline in coming years.



If you are clever you can get almost anything past the customs inspectors. Here are tourists returning from China, laden with bales and barrows marked "tangerines," "rice," "towels," "tea" and "iron ore."

Szpilki (Warsaw), March 1, 1959

To Smuggle or Not To Smuggle

Unjust charges of smuggling also occur. Here is a rare instance of the accused replying publicly to his accuser. To begin with, Jerzy Putrament in *Przegląd Kulturalny* (Warsaw), September 17, 1959, published an article entitled "And Cheated, Too," which strongly criticized the prevalence of smuggling in Poland. Two groups—athletes and tourists—came under fire. Soon after, J. Horodyski in *Zycie Literackie* (Cracow), November 25, printed a "Reply to Putrament," in which he defended some of the tourists (although pointedly not the athletes) accused by Putrament.

"And Cheated, Too"

"Balance sheets concerning the achievements of our industry are published twice a year by the PKPG [State Commission on Economic Planning]. Why, then, don't our customs authorities publish the records of our smugglers and peddlers?

"By the use of the latter word above, I do not, by any means, wish to offend the honorable and worthy representatives of Private Initiative, who, so frequently and in such great numbers, travel abroad—back and forth—in their own automobiles. If they do manage to smuggle something here and there, it's only natural. In any case, they're professionals. And they must, somehow, get back the cost of the trip. Gasoline is so expensive. . . .

"The ones I do have in mind, are the amateur peddlers. An amateur—as we know—is a hot-head and an enthusiast. Recently, our press has exhibited a great interest in various 'hobbies.' The following is the most popular hobby in Poland: smuggling. You might say that children suck this passion into their systems together with their mothers' milk. It is a well known fact that the dear mothers packed women's lingerie into their children's knapsacks when sending the latter to camp in the USSR. Granted that this used to happen several years ago; today, our eastern neighbor's production of ladies' panties has increased.

"Even children. So how about the adults? Still prevalent in the country is a provincial antagonism between intellectuals and athletes. But don't worry. Both have a common denominator—smuggling, of course. We read amazing things about the cyclists. Very amusingly described. First the resounding announcement: no permission to travel abroad for the guilty ones. Then, a toned-down mutter: the ban is to stay in effect for a year, a year and a half. And then: silence.

"Granted, we have to understand our cyclists. If they are to punish their black sheep, then what are they going to use for contenders in future contests? It wasn't only the leading cyclists who participated in the smuggling affair, but also the trainers and the organizers.

"Personally, I'd take the organizers to task first of all. They roam all over the world on State money. The contenders at least sweat and work for their laurels. The organizers? Hm. . . . I wouldn't want to say what they do. They're necessary, unfortunately, because such is the stupid, contemporary custom. Well, then, at least they should keep up appearances. But how can they do this, when both their hands are filled with wrist watches? I would be merciless so far as the organizer-smuggler is concerned. But the sports authorities, alas, are merciful.

"And the non-sports' authorities are unbelievably tolerant. In February of this year one of the 'creative' unions organized a junket to Greece. Transportation by private sleeping

car. Yes, yes. There are connections. The wife of a high official from one of the ministries in charge of communications allegedly went along in the guise of a lucky mascot. But that is an insignificant detail.

"The big affair started in Budapest, where huge amounts of goods were bought and, in turn, sold—for Turkish currency—in Istanbul, where another transaction was begun and completed in the country of Phidias, Praxiteles, Agamemnon, Alcibiades and many, many others. And so, in this unofficial way, the young creators 'created' a means of getting acquainted with the treasures of ancient culture.

"I wonder: who is better? A thief, smuggler and bribe-taker with a higher education and knowledge of ancient culture, or a thief, smuggler and bribe-taker period? Both the one and the other possess their own bewitching charms. . . .

"The following are several modest suggestions. Make up a smugglers' black book. Do not issue any more passports to persons engaged in smuggling. Smuggling has grown to such huge proportions because it is being pursued, among others, by persons who go abroad frequently, know all the right connections, etc., etc. What's the matter? Is it too difficult to compose such a list?

"The second suggestion I make with great trepidation. Since private enterprises and those running them smuggle so much, why not change the social composition of those going abroad? How about giving the workers a bit of a push? Of course, they won't be so elegant. The ladies, too, won't be so stylishly and so revealingly dressed. But maybe they won't engage in so much peddling?"

"Reply to Putrament"

"Putrament went on an Orbis tour of Greece and Istanbul for the modest, working-man's sum of 16,000 *zloty*. I followed him, paying four times less for the excursion. . . . I would not boast about this if it were not for the Putrament article . . . in which our esteemed author graciously discussed our own little group. He did not mention us by name, but it was easy to guess. The matter is slight—granted—but why should honest people be harmed? After all, not everybody is a boxer and gets sent abroad on the department's expense account. People have to manage somehow. . . . Personally, I have already been abroad four times on my own on painfully saved money. . . .


"One must not [refer to us] as Putrament did: 'I wonder who is better? A thief, smuggler and bribe-taker with a higher education and knowledge of ancient culture, or a thief, smuggler and bribe-taker period. Both one and the other are possessed of their own bewitching charms.' I state categorically that none of the members of the artistic unions participating in this trip bartered anything. However, several personal contacts were made with intellectual and artistic circles. . . . It is sad that Deans of universities, writers, artists and famous architects must travel like scouts, without a penny, with a can of food in their knapsacks, that they do not have the money to buy a book or a catalogue, that they sometimes have trouble affording a bath. . . . We traveled in two old, virtually broken-down railway cars . . . six persons per compartment. . . .

"This is a pity! But the useful idea of trips must not be removed with a few irresponsible statements. Other trips are planned for the coming spring—they should if anything be helped. . . . I trust that Putrament's stray bullet will not cut off the road to countries which, alas, are today only a dream."


One of the most striking disparities in Communist attitudes and actions in recent months has involved Communist China's incursions in India. The Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe were very notably reticent in the face of the strident Chinese claims of justification. Their press printed the interchange of notes between India and China quite without the usual heavy partisanship when a Communist nation is involved in an altercation. The USSR stressed that it "maintains friendly relations both with the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India." (Tass [MOSCOW], SEPTEMBER 9, 1959.) The West was accused of blowing up the incident to drive a wedge between China and India. If the Soviet and satellite voices were to be believed, what had occurred was the mildest and most trivial of disagreements between good friends.

At the same time that all this soothing syrup was being poured, China continued to press the most extreme claims and charges against India. An excellent graphic example of this is the accompanying map, which appeared in the English-language propaganda magazine *China Reconstructs* (PEIPING), NOVEMBER, 1959. This map blithely annexes great tracts of India; it also points to numerous alleged Indian aggressions. Nothing is said of the actions of Chinese troops or of Indian protests.

SKETCH MAP



SINO-INDIAN BOUNDARY QUESTION



Echoes from the Polish Writers' Congress

IT IS APPARENT that the Congress of the Union of Polish Writers, held in Warsaw December 3-5, 1959, marked a new stage in the delicate balance between the writers and the regime. During the early days of the "Polish October" of 1956, the writers, who had increasingly been released from the shackles of Stalinist control, gave expression to their new-found freedom. The election in October 1956 of Antoni Slonimski, one of the leading Polish poets, as President of the Writers' Union and a central board containing not a single Party member, pointed the way to an artistic and intellectual revival in Poland. One overt sign that the regime would not accept this as the permanent state of affairs was noted in mid-December 1958 at the ninth Congress of the Writers' Union in Wrocław. At that time, an open rift developed between the writers and regime spokesmen over the question of the State's cultural policy and censorship, but after much heated debate the liberal elements remained in control and even succeeded in passing a resolution demanding an easing of censorship.

Now, one year later, the regime has made it unmistakable that it is determined to move toward stricter control of literature—to the greater glory of "Socialist realism"—while at the same time it is aware of the danger of completely alienating Polish writers. Along with the new policy of "political coordination" for literature, a new presidium of the Writers' Union was elected with regime spokesmen in key positions on the central board (see *EAST EUROPE*, January 1960, p. 36).

The press has given much space to

the proceedings of the Congress and to discussion of its significance. "It [the Congress] awakened interest," states *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), December 17, 1959, "not only in literary circles, but also among Party activists as well as the general public."

In comparing this latest Congress with the one held a year earlier in Wrocław, the Party paper said that "the debates of the Wrocław Congress caused deep apprehension in the Party and among those writers who were concerned about the development of literature in People's Poland. For, at the Wrocław Congress, the majority of speeches were made and the greatest activity shown by a group of writers who made boisterous declarations and, in practice, avoided those positive attitudes toward the social and political developments in the life of the country required by the historical transformations in our country. . . ." In contrast to this, the Warsaw Congress was, to a large extent, "a reflection of the positive changes since the Wrocław Congress. . . . The Warsaw Congress should be considered an important step forward . . . it became a center of serious ideological discussion, defining . . . the basic ideological and artistic problems faced by Polish literature, although a serious difference of views revealed by the discussions was also evident at the meeting, a difference concerning the basic conception of the role of literature in a country building Socialism. Although there were some speakers who repeated the old accusations that the Party wants to dominate the writers and dictate to them in detail what and how they should write, these voices were few and,

for the most, without any great literary prestige."

It is clear that the Party intends to attempt to bring the writers more firmly into line and to rectify the "abnormality of the situation in the recent period"—a phrase by which the cultural politruk Leon Kruczkowski (Radio Warsaw, December 18) meant the unique if limited degree of freedom previously accorded writers. Nevertheless, the climate in Poland is still such that the Party is not demanding the kind of monolithic and blinkered subservience common elsewhere in the bloc. For one thing, non-"Socialist" art is, according to recent statements, to be permitted. As *Trybuna Ludu*, December 17, put it: "Socialist art demands a Socialist consciousness; Socialist literature is mainly the task of Socialist writers. Nevertheless, there is room in contemporary Poland for progressive, humanist art which—although its creators do not share the Marxist view—can be our ally whether it is created in Poland or abroad. What is more, we do not want to separate ourselves from various artistic creations of non-Socialist writers whenever they are not actually hostile to Socialism and progress."

This attempt to straddle two horses going in opposite directions has been responsible for no inconsiderable amount of verbal juggling on the part of some of the spokesmen for the Party's cultural line. Stefan Żolkiewski, editor of *Nova Kultura*, provided the main ideological platform for the Congress. In his speech, delivered to the Congress and published by *Trybuna Ludu*, December 8, he advocated a fervent "engagement" for the writer and proffered



Tadeusz Holuj
Zycie Literackie (Cracow), December 13, 1959

Socialist realism as the proper creative method. "This," he said, "is connected with the matter of creating a new hero . . . with a militant and uncompromising denial of the capitalist community, with a conviction of the necessity of the victory of Socialism . . . and, in our specific conditions of political and social development, with a Party character in work." In a broadside attack on the literary works which appeared after October 1956, he stated, "the attempts—onesidedly critical and confused in detail—to write of the Polish conflicts in 1956 and 1957 have generally been unjust and therefore ridiculous and even completely useless in relation to genuine, contemporary problems. Above all, they were in many instances simply an expression of reactionary prejudices without regard to reality." On the other hand, in discussing the problems of the Party's influence on art, he declared, among other things, that the Party does not want to make a choice for writers: "Nobody wants to impose or decree Socialist realism as the only model of creative work in our literary life. It [the Party] wants to struggle, using ideological means, for developing the correct line in art. It wants writers to help implement the present tasks of Socialist construction." And, in the same vein: "Competent political guidance by the Party is indispensable for writers in the field of the social tasks of art . . . but 'the Party does not intend to pronounce verdicts in artistic matters.'" In reference to the possibility of a further extension of cultural relations with the "capitalist countries" Zolkiewski stressed that the literature of "Socialist" countries will have to don the proper "ideological armor" and, he added, "we must deepen and strengthen our cultural contacts with the Socialist countries . . . we must learn to cooperate

more closely with the progressive forces in the non-Socialist countries within the limits of the cultural movements inspired by them."

In another address to the Congress, Tadeusz Holuj, a postwar Communist writer from Cracow, gave further expression to the Party's ambivalence. He declared that Communist writers "support wholly the principle of artistic freedom and they take it upon themselves to guard this freedom in the concrete practice of cultural policy in Poland." But, while proclaiming that there will be no curtailment of freedom insofar as artistic attitudes are concerned, he reminded his listeners that "of course, political evaluation of the writers' efforts lies in the province of the Party." Holuj also drew a distinction between "Socialist literature" and "literature in a country building Socialism." He stressed the need for works by authors who accept the trend of social changes but do not necessarily accept Marxist ideas, as well as those close to the general philosophical concepts of "historical materialism" but having different esthetic views. However, he pointed out that hostile trends in literature, in which category he included the criticism and negation of the literary output of the years 1949-55, must be completely eliminated from the country's artistic life.

Zycie Literackie, the Cracow literary weekly, published on December 13 the speech of the well-known Communist writer, Jerzy Putrament, delivered at the congress. Putrament was one of the three Party members (with Zolkiewski and Kruczkowski) elected to the Central Board of the Writers' Union. He urged writers to negotiate with the Party:

"We have a right to talk with the Party, we should talk with the Party, we should negotiate with it; but we must self-critically admit that the Polish Writers' Union has less force than the Party. . . . This does not mean that the Party can deal blows and receive none in return. The Party can also be painfully hit by literature and—it must be admitted—it has received some very painful blows. But in general evaluation, the Party is stronger and that means that if we want to talk with the Party and not stage a demonstration—then we must think out in advance which matters can be solved and which cannot. . . ."

The new cultural policy of closer "collaboration between writers and the Party" has not, however, been wholeheartedly acclaimed by all press voices.

Wladyslaw Machejek, editor in chief of *Zycie Literackie*, expressed certain strong—although of necessity delicately phrased—reservations about the possibilities of Party hacks controlling literature. Although he proffered agreement with the resolutions of the Congress, in an article entitled "The Party and the Writer," December 13, he went on to say:

"Are writers deprived of their responsibility for life and the development of man if the Party assumes leadership in the field of culture? No, they are not deprived, on the contrary, they are called forward. But one is not only supposed to be responsible, one has to try out one's sensibility in the concrete toil of changing a backward country into a progressive one—together with the Party and all the activists in the nation. What do I understand by a unity of action with the Party and its ideological aid for writers? That an enemy of the Party line will always be 'admin-



Jerzy Putrament
Zycie Literackie (Cracow), December 13, 1959

istering,' giving orders to culture. Ideological aid is one thing, dictation of what and how a thing is to be written is another. Nothing will come out of being yes-men. The Party is a living organism, which goes through constant changes in accordance with dialectics and is little influenced by even longer-lasting slow-downs; it goes through a process of change together with the whole of humanity and, therefore, it must not be identified with an abstraction or an oracle sitting behind a desk. Engaging ourselves socially, we have the right to solve the problems of the present and to move forward the processes of the transformation of life of which the Party is only a part, together with the Party. We have the last word in matters of culture, together with the Party."



Scinteia House, the Romanian regime's periodical publication center in Bucharest.

Rominia Libera (Bucharest), September 8, 1959

THE STALINIST PRESS

The workings of Communist journalism in Romania and Czechoslovakia, where the press has changed little since the days of Stalin. The Bulgarian press was discussed in the November issue.

ROMANIA

IN ROMANIA, "Scinteia House," a large building modelled on Soviet design, dominates the field of newspaper publishing. Aside from the major official Party daily, *Scinteia*, other regime dailies are printed in this building—including *Rominia Libera*, *Scinteia Tineretului* and *Munca*—as well as some eighteen weeklies and a number of textbooks, pamphlets, novels and posters. "Scinteia House" is supposed to be a regime showpiece, testimony to its journalistic and literary accomplishments, but even a desultory survey of these achievements cannot help but emphasize that they include some of the most dismal publications to be found in the Soviet orbit.

In prewar Romania, the press format reflected Western influence; today newspapers and periodicals are thoroughly Sovietized and still retain the tedious and impersonal quality of all Stalinist publications. In the past few years,

the face of the Romanian press has shown little alteration, betraying almost no trace of the intellectual ferment that, temporarily at least, changed the features of a varied assortment of publications in other East European countries. On May 5, 1955, when the thaw was affecting other parts of the area, *Scinteia* declared: "Our press—which is directed with special care by the Party and which is inspired by the broad experience of the Soviet press—has achieved important successes in mobilizing and organizing the large masses of our working people in the task of building Socialism. The press of our country faithfully transmits the Party's messages." Three years later, in the midst of an areawide Communist effort to clamp down on intellectual deviation, *Scinteia* discussed the role of the press in almost the same words:

"The most ardent wish of our press is to reach the peak of its mission and faithfully to transmit the Party's messages. Publications belonging to private groups with inter-

ests different from those of the working people do not exist in our country. This is why our press has only one aim—to promote the Party's Marxist-Leninist policy, a policy approved and enthusiastically carried out by our working people. Our Party teaches the press to be very strict, not only in regard to the various aspects of Socialist building, but also in connection with its own activity."

To ensure transmission of the Party's "messages," rather than news, Romanian newspapermen are forbidden to collect or use unofficial statistics, even though the majority of journalists are Party members. The press transmits only that information which the Party wants to disseminate and rarely contains anything of human interest. Although certainly newsworthy, the first death sentence for a theft of "Socialist" property was announced by only one daily—*Rominia Libera*, July 23, 1958; similarly, government appointments or dismissals are reported only when the Party deems it appropriate, and frequently such items appear in small print on a back page. To justify some of its news omissions, the Party has worked out a theory about the impropriety of a "sensational" press. At an international journalists' meeting in Bucharest, May 1958, the Romanian delegate, Nicolae Moraru, was asked by a Swiss correspondent why no train crashes were ever reported in Romanian newspapers. Mr. Moraru replied as follows:

"What sense is there in announcing such a catastrophe in a sensational manner? This would mean that we would only make thousands of families terribly anxious. . . . Nevertheless, this does not mean that the press cannot and must not be concerned with such topics. But only on one condition: that people are not terrified, that we seek the cause of crashes and try to eliminate them. Thus, one must write an analytical article and not one with sensational characteristics."

From further statements by Mr. Moraru, however, it appears that sensationalism is justified in certain instances—i.e., on occasions which reflect well on the regime:

"It is completely different if we speak of the need to transmit news or events which are important for the people. I believe that sensational events occur in our country also. For instance, when . . . the atomic reactor was put into operation I considered it a sensational phenomenon, but of a just and nice kind, which fills the people's heart with joy. Of course, when a furnace starts operations in our Hunedoara plant, this fact should be made known immediately and developed in editorials, so as to show the working people how we can work, how we fight and contribute to the cause of peace, to man and his life." (*Presa Noastra* [Bucharest], May-June 1958.)

According to Party spokesmen, the task of Communist dailies is to record "meaningful daily events" which "raise a mirror to the new society." That the regime feels there is a sharp distinction between news and "meaningful daily events" was made clear in an article in the February 1958 issue of *Presa Noastra*, monthly of the Journalists' Union; Alexandru Cornescu, one of the editors of *Rominia Libera*, complained that reporters and editors tended to write articles and news stories that were not printworthy in that they failed to represent any "significant value." "I could

go even further," Mr. Cornescu declared, "and say that there are reporters and editors who show an obvious attraction for such articles."

Circulation

The recording of "meaningful" daily events, it is claimed, has endeared the Romanian press to the people. According to the Mr. Moraru quoted above, interest in the Romanian press is constantly increasing:

"I can give some very conclusive figures. For instance, in [prewar] Romania, the most important daily, *Dimineata*, managed to sell a maximum of 225,000 copies daily. Today, *Scinteia* sells 920,000 copies; *Scinteia Tineretului*, 305,000; *Rominia Libera*, 232,000 copies; *Elore*, the newspaper for the Magyar minority, 120,000; *Neuer Weg*, for the Germany minority, 70,000 copies—and this for a population of 400,000 Germans living in our country. Periodicals like *Contemporarul* sell 60,000 weekly. And our magazine for foreign countries, *Romania Populara*, sells 200,000 copies. These are facts. It is inconceivable to print a newspaper for the purpose of putting it in storage. If copies are returned, the number of copies printed is obligatorily reduced. To prove these facts, I have brought letters from readers who complain that there are not enough newspapers on the stands. For instance, a teacher from Curtea de Arges complains that his local post office does not accept subscriptions and that the number of copies set aside for local consumption in that town is totally exhausted."

Although the Communists persistently declare that the popularity of the press is documented by sales and letters



Inside Scinteia House.

Presa Noastra (Bucharest), February 1958

from readers, a number of private reports point out the policy of compulsory subscriptions for the Party dailies. In the early days of Communist rule, Party candidates had to pass a loyalty test which consisted of making door-to-door sales of *Scinteia*. No returns were accepted. Another sales method, still in use today, is the practice of deducting subscription fees from wages. A worker would hardly dare protest in view of what refusal to take the Party paper might mean for his well-being in the Communist State.

Furthermore, the policy of holding conferences with readers, and the training and large-scale use of worker correspondents—non-professionals whose task it is to report and criticize local developments with Party-minded dedication—are evidence of the Party's attempt to whip up interest in the press, as well as to use it for exposing "un-Communist attitudes" and for eliminating obstacles to "Socialist construction" in factories and offices. A revealing description of these reader conferences was given by *Presa Noastra*, February 1958:

"Although irregularly, we [on *Rominia Libera*] have tried during the past year to have monthly consultations with our readers. Recently we have modified somewhat the structure of these meetings. In the past we had meetings attended by a great number of readers who very often did not read our newspapers, and we were surprised to find that either they spoke about other newspapers or did not speak at all. At present, we have organized meetings attended by fewer readers who read our newspaper regularly. Such meetings are no longer held at town or regional levels but take place in industrial units, people's councils, villages, streets, etc. . . . The readers' observations are brought to the attention of the editorial staff and adequate measures are taken."

Worker-Correspondents

According to *Presa Noastra*, October 1958, the voluntary correspondents are usually drafted by professional journalists during visits to factories or institutions in connection with production competitions organized by various newspapers. The work of these correspondents, in the words of *Presa Noastra*, provides "the richest and most secure source of information," and can be described as "tireless activity in the cause of the Party and Socialism." This tireless activity consists in writing letters about instances of waste, inefficiency, etc., which the Party, via the press, then tries to correct. *Scinteia*, for example, demands that State organs criticized in letters issue a reply. One letter, calling for the "rational use of wood" thus allegedly led to improvements in the Railroad Department which, by the time it answered the charges, had reduced waste by 13 percent (*Presa Noastra*, December 1958).

A typical communication from a voluntary correspondent was the following letter in *Munca*, October 28, 1959, addressed to the "Comrade Director of the UIL Frasin Enterprise":

"In September . . . your enterprise undertook the obligation to deliver to the Vasile Roaita plant . . . 100 cubic meters of timber. One third of this material was to be delivered before October 10th. But we . . . have not re-

ceived any material. And this is very frustrating, Comrade Director. We mechanics are working arduously to fulfill and exceed the plan. Right now we have 100 sowing machines . . . which we cannot deliver because they have no ladders. And the ladders cannot be made because the timber is still in your enterprise. Therefore we cannot fulfill our tasks because you do not fulfill yours. You keep postponing your obligations. How long do we have to wait?"

Scinteia, November 5, 1959, published one letter exposing the fraudulent practices of school officials and another complaining about lack of "cultural activity" in an enterprise in the Reghin district. Similarly, on November 15, 1959, *Scinteia* published a letter by an engineer criticizing the lack of firefighting equipment in a Bucharest construction yard. As it often does, *Scinteia* footnoted the communication with the remark that the engineer's observations had been verified: "The comrades in charge of the construction yard do not act with responsibility. . . . The people who constructed the project, the builders and the P.I.C. [Fire Department] organs . . . are guilty."

Inevitably, the worker correspondents are regarded as spies and informers. *Scinteia*, June 26, 1959, described how one worker-correspondent was removed from his job as



The front cover of *Czechoslovak Trade Unions*, No. 5, 1959, one of the numerous foreign language propaganda periodicals sent out by the Czechoslovak regime.

statistician at the Buzau Metallurgical Enterprise after writing a letter claiming that the management did not encourage technical improvements or try to raise the workers' qualifications by organizing courses. Not all the letters, however, are directed at managerial incompetence. Some of them dutifully cite Communist achievements. The correspondents published in *Scinteia*, October 22, 1959, cited instances of successful plan fulfillment, increased medical assistance, wide-scale scrap iron collection and improvements in production techniques. Significantly, according to *Presa Noastra*, June 1959, the best voluntary correspondents in individual regions are now being formed into so-called under-editorial staffs which will be headed by professional journalists.

Press Profile

THE MOST IMPORTANT of the six Bucharest dailies is, of course, *Scinteia*, the Party organ. Similar both in content and format to *Scinteia* are *Rominia Libera*, organ of the People's Councils; *Scinteia Tineretului*, organ of the Communist youth union; *Munca*, the Trade Union organ; and *Steagul Rosu*, organ of the People's Council of the Bucharest regime. The only daily which departs slightly from the official Party stereotype is *Informatia Bucurestilor*, an afternoon paper put out by the Bucharest City People's Council and distributed only in Bucharest. Unlike the others, which are filled with ideological, political and economic pronouncements, *Informatia Bucurestilor* deals to some degree with the lighter side of life and contains detailed information on the theater, the cinema, fashions, exhibitions, etc., and it is the one paper in Romania which regularly carries display and classified advertising. Its popularity has not always met with Party approval, and *Scinteia* recently criticized the paper for printing an insufficient amount of political and ideological material.

Periodicals

While the dailies in general rarely have invoked regime displeasure in the past few years, the literary-cultural periodicals have been subjected to sharp scrutiny despite the fact that, compared to their counterparts in the other East European countries, they have remained tepid and orthodox. Keeping a stringent eye out for signs of deviationism, the regime has elicited self-criticism from almost all the literary publications and in early 1959 issued harsh rebukes to the staffs of *Steaua*, *Tribuna* and the Hungarian-language *Utunk*—all organs of the Cluj Writers' Union—for propagating "harmful, chauvinistic and nationalist ideas." More mildly criticized were *Viata Romineasca* and *Gazeta Literara*, respectively the monthly and weekly of the Writers Union in Bucharest; *Musica*, the Composers' Union monthly; *Arta Plastica*, the monthly issued by the Painters' and Sculptors' Union; *Teatrul*, the theater monthly issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture; *Contemporanul*, the social-cultural weekly issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture; and *Iasul Literara* and *Scrisul Banatean*, monthly organs of the Moldavian and

Banat Writers' Unions. The popular Bucharest women's magazine *Femeia* also was chastised, in particular for publishing a fluffy, "decadent" short story.

In 1958, to promote the "literature of Socialist realism," the regime launched a new literary biweekly, *Luceafarul*, which, aside from depicting "the achievements of our regime, the quick transformation which has occurred before our very eyes, the new people building Socialism," evidently was assigned the mission of overseeing other literary publications and helping them to eliminate "ideological errors." Since its establishment, *Luceafarul* has taken a strong stand against "non-Marxist" literary criticism, decadent poetry and other examples of "lame ideology" which have appeared in various Romanian publications.

Aside from the cultural publications, most of the other Romanian periodicals have faithfully fulfilled their function from the Party's viewpoint, whether in the field of satire like *Urzica*, economics, like *Finance si Credit*, or in the indoctrination of youth, like *Tanarul Leninist*. Altogether the official *Cartimex* catalogue lists 311 newspapers and magazines in Romania, with publications dedicated to industry, agriculture, technology, science, law, tourism, archeology, folklore, fashion, history, games, religion, etc. Aside from Romanian-language publications, the regime also issues a number of periodicals in Hun-



This front page of the Czechoslovak picture weekly *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague) November 8, 1958, honors the fortieth anniversary of Komsomol, the Soviet Communist youth organization; the young woman is presumably a Komsomol stalwart and was chosen by the editors of *Svet v Obrazech* as an ideal type.

garian, several in German, one in Serbian, a fortnightly in Ukrainian (*Novii Vik*), and a monthly in Armenian (*Sevan*) for minority groups. No publications exist, however, for the Yiddish-speaking minority. Among the publications destined for abroad are the monthly *Romania Today*, printed in English, French, German and Spanish editions and the literary quarterly, *The Romanian Review*, issued in English, French, German and Russian. All these reflect the press' subservience to the Party, and in one way or another bear the dreary earmarks of official manifestos.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, the campaign to suppress "revisionist" voices in the press began almost immediately after the 1956 Hungarian Revolt, and by early 1957 was more or less successful. In Slovakia, where the ferment was greatest, particularly in literary periodicals, the writers protested but fought a losing battle. On February 2, 1957, the Slovak Writers' Union weekly *Kulturny Zivot* (Bratislava) bitterly complained: "It looks as if journalists—personalities with judgments and opinions of their own—have already died out in our midst, as if there are no more voices speaking for the people. . . . It seems that there exists only a formless mass of newspaper employees who are unable to rise above and beyond the bulletins of the Czechoslovak Press Bureau."

The liquidation of "revisionism" in the press, particularly in Slovakia, did not solve the Party's problems: sporadic signs of unrest continued; "bourgeois attitudes" could still be found infiltrating the pages of newspapers and magazines; and publications fell far short of their Party-assigned role as militant propagators of Socialist construction. In the youth daily, *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), February 24, 1959, Minister of Education and Culture Frantisek Kahuda complained about "objectivity" in newspaper reporting; Radio Bratislava, February 10, 1959, declared that the absence of "revisionism" in the press did not merit complacency: "We cannot content ourselves with the fact that what our press publishes is correct. In the present stage of development the second basic task of our press is to move to the forefront—that is, to promote Communist ideas, to depict contemporary events in the light of Marxism-Leninism, relentlessly to criticize the old and the reactionary, and militantly to refute the relics of bourgeois ideology"; and *Rude Pravo*, the Prague Party daily, February 28, 1959, accused the since-liquidated literary monthly *Koeten* of "ideological blunders" and found the monthly review of world culture *Svetova Literatura* (Prague) guilty of publishing "unmistakably" bourgeois works without supplying proper Marxist commentaries.*

**Koeten* (May), started in 1956; it was produced by a group of young writers, poets and critics who used it to conduct a lively crusade against the stuffiness of Communist culture. It was abolished in June 1959 along with *Novy Zivot* (New Life), which had often supported its policies, for lagging behind the "progress" of Czechoslovak literature. See *East Europe*, September 1959, pp. 26-30.

A Sample Scinteia: December 2, 1959

THE PARTY PAPER'S front page contained a two-column headline entitled, "Valorous Initiatives in Socialist Competitions," as well as articles on: zoo-technical improvements in Fetesti; the fifteenth anniversary of Albanian "liberation"; regional agricultural expositions; and the voluntary labor activities of youth in the city of Iasi. The first page also included a photograph of two women steel workers who had surpassed their quota, labor news briefs, a photograph of a leading cyclist, and an item stating that one out of every four persons in the city of Braila had savings accounts.

On page 2, *Scinteia* printed an editorial on "promoting a rich creative life" in the theaters; criticisms from readers and answers from officials; sports news; movie and TV programs; and a photograph of a work brigade that had overfulfilled the plan.

Page 3 included a long report on the Seventh Hungarian Party Congress in Budapest, brief national news, and a notice of a Romanian-Finnish trade agreement. The fourth page of *Scinteia* was devoted largely to news from abroad. Items appeared on: Khrushchev's arrival in Budapest; festivities in Belgrade commemorating the liberation of Yugoslavia; a strike of one million State employees in France; a demonstration in Brussels against an amnesty for war criminals; strong opposition in Blackpool, England to right-wing Labor leaders; a strike of electrical workers in England; "new incidents in the Panama Canal Zone"; "Africa Destroys Colonial Handcuffs"; and an item on the US failure to send a satellite to the moon (this report was a quotation from *The New York Times*). In addition, there was an article describing the film of Khrushchev's US visit and a photograph of Khrushchev shaking hands with US workers.

No Spirit of Party-mindedness

A subsequent article which appeared in the Slovak Party daily *Pravda* (Bratislava), March 22, 1959, presented a clear view of the Party's difficulties in the crucial field of culture. What it revealed was that press, radio and television workers either evaded Party prerequisites or fulfilled them haphazardly and with the utmost reluctance. Surveying the Slovak press, *Pravda* optimistically asserted that the majority of cultural activists had shed their former passivity and rigidity and had engaged in an active struggle against "harmful phenomena." However, the paper then described the following situation:

"Our press, and particularly our radio and TV, do not show any initiative in presenting and solving topical problems, but deal with them for the most part like a belated voice following lengthy discussions in literary and artistic circles. Nor do [they] show adequate ideological militancy or make a sufficient effort to influence . . . readers in the spirit of persistent Party-mindedness. One often feels that

some cultural editors surrender to the authority of mistaken aestheticians. It even happens that [some] staff contributors . . . use their monopolistic position . . . to present their own subjectivistic views.

"The cultural [writers] follow in the wake of events; they have an inadequate effect on cultural life and register . . . only facts. Sometimes they even fail to fill the role of reporter responsibly. Uncritical information is particularly typical of cultural columns in *Kulturny Zivot*, *Vecernik* and *Lud*. Even *Směna*, though devoting considerable attention to culture, does more to record facts . . . than it does to analyze them.

"Some newspapers and journals concentrate their reports on professional problems. . . . *Vecernik*, in particular, concentrates on 'artistic' criteria . . . and obscures the problem of the social effects of art. The editors of *Vecernik*, for example, as well as those of *Směna* and *Praca* manifested an unprincipled attitude in reviewing the cabaret show 'Rendezvous in Bratislava,' on which they commented favorably despite its obvious ideological shortcomings.

"Objectivism, the uncritical publication of incorrect and contradictory views, is a typical feature of the journal *Kulturny Zivot*. . . . Lack of Party-mindedness has become chronic with *Kulturny Zivot's* editors. . . . Many shortcomings have . . . appeared in our press in literary reviews. . . . The paper *Lud* manifested an uncritical attitude in its unreserved approval of a collection of stories by the Russian emigre Bunin. The fact that the term 'Socialist realism' seems to have disappeared altogether

from our newspapers and periodicals must also be criticized sharply. The same ideological shortcomings . . . are manifested in film reviews in such publications as *Kulturny Zivot*, *Lud* and *Sloboda*. *Vecernik*, in particular . . . has tended to give favorable reviews to films which are devoid of ideas or which lack sufficient social content. . . .

"All journals and the radio failed to devote sufficient attention to Soviet films and films from the People's Democracies. A certain improvement has been noted recently. . . ."

The Deadly Dailies

ASIDE FROM expressions of ferment in the field of culture, the face of the Czechoslovak press has changed little in the past few years. Most of the regime-run dailies continued to provide their usual dreary fare. A former Slovak editor who escaped to the West in 1957 has briefly described the plight of the Party dailies from the Stalinist era to the present. Prior to 1953, he stated, the people considered the the Party dailies as dead matter, and while the Bratislava *Pravda* was circulated in 400,000 copies this could be attributed solely to the fact that the mailman delivered his quota. After Stalin's death the atmosphere eased somewhat and there was a tendency to staff dailies with experienced journalists instead of people who had been whisked through Party courses. There was talk of reconstructing the press and a few articles on such hitherto



The Czechoslovak picture weekly *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague) reserved its back page in 1958 for animal pictures. These are



two examples of the publication's less-than-human interest, from the issues of June 21 and January 11, 1958.

unmentionable subjects as housing and supply difficulties began to appear.

By 1955, there was outspoken criticism of the daily press by readers. The editors' biggest headache was the lead article: "You sound just like a *Pravda* editorial," was a common gibe in that period, although almost the only people who actually read *Pravda's* editorials were those who wrote them. To enliven the press, more short stories and reports on provincial events were included, and the stereotyped communications of the "voluntary correspondents" began to decrease. Only *Pravda's* editors were reluctant to dismiss them in an effort to avoid public ridicule. Another development in this period was a new rivalry between *Pravda* and *Prava*, the Slovak Trade Union daily, which displayed a tendency to abandon Stalinism. At Party Central Committee sessions, *Pravda* editors loudly criticized *Prava* for "going in for bourgeois-style news presentation."

The 20th Soviet Party Congress in February 1956 sent hopes for liberalization soaring. Rank and file journalists speculated about large-scale changes in the government and predicted the downfall of the top leaders of the Stalinist period. At editorial conferences, journalists, particularly non-Communists, were encouraged to voice their opinions about what changes should be made. The most outspoken critics were graduates of Marxism-Leninism courses, who insisted on the elimination of Stalinists. These sentiments were shared by a large proportion of university youth. The Hungarian Revolt in the fall of 1956 put a swift end to this optimism. According to the escaped Slovak editor, "the Revolt caught most editors completely by surprise":

"The only paper which did not delay publishing news of the event was the Bratislava evening paper, *Vecernik*. As soon as the Party recuperated from the blow, *Vecernik* was severely reprimanded for its first news story, and to atone for its errors the paper published on the third day of the uprising a news item asserting that it had been crushed. The regime insisted that the Revolt be painted in the darkest colors, and when the Soviet Army finally surrounded the Budapest parliament building all Czechoslovak dailies issued special editions rejoicing at the defeat of the "counterrevolution" and the formation of a new government. Editors were told to go into the streets to see at first hand the people's exhilaration. They came back with long faces and naturally had to invent copy. Shortly after this, all papers were ordered to publish reports on how Hungarian refugees were returning home in scores."

After the Revolt, the Czechoslovak press became Moscow's chief spokesman in Eastern Europe and devoted innumerable articles to criticism of the "Polish road," signs of "revisionism" and other "distortions" of Socialism.

Press Profile

ACCORDING TO the Prague publication *Statisticky Obzor* (Statistical Horizon), July 1959, there were a total of, 1,510 publications in Czechoslovakia in 1959. Of this number, 509 were issued by factories and branches of the Trade Union organization; 318 specialized in agricultural problems; 132 dealt with culture, "enlightenment" and art;

87 covered developments in domestic and foreign policy; 84 were dedicated to problems of the economy and social welfare; 59 were devoted to pedagogics, education and linguistics; and 36 publications were issued for youth. Altogether, the Czechoslovak government published 17 dailies, 493 weeklies, 409 bi-monthlies, 428 monthlies and 163 other periodicals. Employed on these publications were about 3,000 journalists (800 in Slovakia) whose average age was about 35.

(Continued on page 41)

A Sample Rude Pravo: December 2, 1959

ON THIS DAY the Party daily issued a six-page issue.

On the first page there was an editorial entitled, "As a Sign of Friendship with the People of Africa," and news stories on such subjects as: the construction of fifty new apartments in South Bohemia; the existence of 844 collectives in the Brno region; outstanding performances in a West Bohemian mine; the national conference of agricultural innovators in Brno; and the official speeches made on the occasion of the departure of the President of Guinea from Czechoslovakia.

Page 2 contained a huge headline: "Our Working People Discuss the Directives of the Third Five Year Plan," and was dedicated almost exclusively to pledges concerning plan fulfillment. Page 3 was devoted wholly to Khrushchev's speech at the Hungarian Party Congress in Budapest and contained a photograph of Khrushchev at the meeting. The transcription of the speech was carried over to page 4, which also contained numerous items on the Congress. Page 4 also carried cultural news briefs, and articles on: the blossoming of Slovak musical culture; the premieres of Soviet plays in Prague and Liberec; and the visits of Communist poets to farms and factories "to strengthen ties with the people."

Page 5 contained a number of foreign news briefs, including items on: "Bonn's aggressive policy"; "terror against South Vietnamese patriots"; criticism of the "pro-American policy" of the Greek parliament; and election preparations in Cyprus. Page 5 also contained a report on a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Trade Union Council, a letter on directives of the Third Five Year Plan, and articles on the fortieth anniversary of Brno University, care for the aged in Slovakia, and careers for high school graduates. The latter article urged young people to enter technical or agricultural professions.

The last page contained sports news, radio, theater and TV programs and brief items on: activities in the UN; Adenauer's arrival in Paris; the poor perspectives for US rocket research; the recent cultural agreement between the USSR and Great Britain; and the Soviet-US agreement on peaceful research in the Antarctic. There was also an item on the "increasing anti-imperialist struggle in Latin America."

Leading Czechoslovak Publications

Dailies

Title	City	Circulation	Description
<i>Lidova Demokracie</i> (People's Democracy)	Prague	122,000	Organ of the Communist-controlled Czechoslovak People's (Catholic) Party.
<i>Lud</i> (The People)	Bratislava	5,000	Organ of the Communist-controlled Slovak Renaissance Party.
<i>Mlada Fronta</i> (Youth Front)	Prague	130,000	Organ of the Communist-controlled Czechoslovak Youth League.
<i>Obrana Lidu</i> (People's Defense)	Prague	67,000	Organ of the Ministry of National Defense; contains daily news with special emphasis on military life and developments.
<i>Praca</i> (Work)	Prague	220,000	Organ of the Communist Trade Union organization for the Czech lands.
<i>Prace</i> (Work)	Bratislava	130,000	Counterpart of <i>Prace</i> for Slovakia.
<i>Pravda</i> (Truth)	Bratislava	250,000	Organ of the CC of the Slovak Communist Party; considered less important than <i>Rude Pravo</i> .
<i>Rude Pravo</i> (Red Right)	Prague	700,000	Organ of the CC of the Czechoslovak Communist Party; in 1960, <i>Rude Pravo</i> will be printed in Bratislava also in Slovak.
<i>Rolnicke Noviny</i> (Farmers' News)	Bratislava	50,000	Organ of the Slovak Commissioner of Agriculture; became a daily in 1959; previously appeared three times weekly.
<i>Smena</i> (Young Shift)	Bratislava	60,000	Organ of the Communist-controlled Youth Y League in Slovakia.
<i>Svobodne Slovo</i> (Free Word)	Prague	122,000	Organ of the Communist-controlled Youth League in Slovakia.
<i>Vecerni Praha</i> (Evening in Prague)	Prague	60,000	Evening paper put out by regional trade union council in Prague; most popular and least propagandistic paper in Prague.
<i>Vecernik</i> (Evening News)	Bratislava	?	Counterpart of <i>Vecerni Praha</i> ; most popular daily in Bratislava.
<i>Zemedelske Noviny</i> (Agricultural News)	Prague	92,000	Organ of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Weeklies

<i>Dikobraz</i> (Porcupine)	Prague	250,000	"Satirical" publication issued by the <i>Rude Pravo</i> publishing house; contains cartoons, humorous stories, jokes, etc.
<i>Hospodarske Noviny</i> (Economic News)	Prague	?	Publication started three years ago for economists; issued by Orbis.
<i>Kultura</i> (Culture)	Prague	?	Cultural weekly started three years ago by Orbis.
<i>Kulturny Zivot</i> (Cultural Life)	Bratislava	?	Organ of the Slovak Writers' Union; in 1955-56, outspoken in demands for liberalization.
<i>Kvety</i> (Blossoms)	Prague	?	Popular illustrated magazine put out by the <i>Rude Pravo</i> publishing house.
<i>Literarni Noviny</i> (Literary News)	Prague	?	Organ of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union; editorial staff reshuffled in early 1959, probably for the purpose of strengthening the periodical's "Socialist" content.
<i>Rohac</i> (Stag Beetle)	Bratislava	?	Slovak equivalent of <i>Dikobraz</i> .
<i>Slovenka</i> (The Slovak Woman)	Bratislava	?	Illustrated magazine for women.
<i>Sloboda</i> (Freedom)	Bratislava	?	Organ of the puppet Slovak Freedom Party.

Title	City	Circulation	Description
<i>Stadion</i> (Stadium)	Prague	?	Illustrated magazine issued by the Czechoslovak Union for Physical Training.
<i>Svet v Obrazech</i> (The World in Pictures)	Prague	?	Popular illustrated magazine on international, political, economic affairs.
<i>Svet Sovetu</i> (World of the Soviets)	Prague	?	Illustrated magazine published by the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society.
<i>Tvorba</i> (Creation)	Prague	?	A "Stalinist" periodical on politics, culture and economics; issued by Rude Pravo publishing house.
<i>Učitelské Noviny</i> (Teachers' News)	Prague	?	Issued by the Ministry of Education and trade union employees in related fields.
<i>Usta</i> (A woman's name)	Prague	?	Czech counterpart of <i>Slovenka</i> .
<i>Zivot</i> (Life)	Bratislava	?	Slovak counterpart of <i>Kvety</i> .

Monthlies

<i>Architektura</i> (Architecture)	Prague	?	Magazine issued by the Union of Czechoslovak Architects.
<i>Divadelní Noviny</i> (Theatrical News)	Prague	?	Issued 30 times yearly by the Union of Czechoslovak Theatrical Artists.
<i>Divadlo</i> (Theater)	Prague	?	Professional publications for theater people; appears 10 times annually.
<i>Finance a Uver</i> (Finance and Credit)	Prague	?	Issued by the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank of Czechoslovakia.
<i>Host do Domu</i> (Guest in the House)	Brno	?	Publication on literature, art and criticism issued by the Czechoslovak Writers' Union.
<i>Klub</i> (Club)	Prague	?	Issued by the Trade Union organization; deals with the "cultural work of the masses of working people; illustrated.
<i>Nova Mysl</i> (New Mind)	Prague	?	Theoretical organ of the Communist Party Central Committee.
<i>Plamen</i> (The Flame)	Prague	?	New literary periodical with emphasis on "Socialist realism"; replaces the recently liquidated <i>Kveten</i> and <i>Novy Zivot</i> , accused of printing un-Party-minded literature.
<i>Planovane Hospodarstvi</i> (Planned Economy)	Prague	?	Issued by the State Planning Commission.
<i>Prague News Letter</i>	Prague	?	English-language fortnightly for foreign consumption; survey of economic, political and cultural life in Czechoslovakia.
<i>Pravnik</i> (The Jurist)	Prague	?	Professional publication on law issued by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.
<i>Reklama</i> (Publicity)	Prague	?	Issued by the Ministry of Internal Trade.
<i>Svetova Literatura</i> (World Literature)	Prague	?	A popular magazine on international cultural-scientific developments put out by the Czechoslovak Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge.
<i>Turistika</i> (Tourist Movement)	Prague	?	A magazine for tourists.
<i>Zahranicni Obchod</i> (Foreign Trade)	Prague	?	Issued by the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce.
<i>Zlaty Maj</i> (Golden May)	Prague	?	A critical art review for young people.

Until recently, all journalists were obliged to belong to the Communist-controlled Journalists' Union. At a Journalists' Congress in June 1957, however, it was suggested that membership be made voluntary and that writers not actually employed in editorial offices be allowed to belong. A law to this effect was finally promulgated on July 25, 1958, and the Union, at least outwardly, divested itself of the characteristics of a disciplinary organization.

A crucial role in the regime's program to use the press as a major weapon in the propagation of "Socialism" is played by the Postal Newspaper Service, founded in 1953. This organization is responsible not only for the delivery of newspapers and periodicals and the collection of fees from subscribers but also for the recruitment and registration of new subscribers and distribution to retailers. More than 3,000 post offices and 16,000 mailmen are involved in the Postal Newspaper Service's operations. According to *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 26, 1958, the organization helped increase the total circulation of newspapers and magazines by 1½ million between 1956 and 1958, bringing it up to 11,734,980 copies: "In this period, the sale of national dailies increased by more than 375,000 per issue and that of regional papers by more than 117,000. Almost 4,000,000 copies of newspapers and magazines are now delivered, which means that every family subscribes on an average to one paper or magazine, not counting newsstand purchases." *Rude Pravo* also claimed that between 1956 and 1958, the number of returns declined from 5 percent to 1.4.

Nevertheless, the Party is still dissatisfied with circulation, particularly in rural areas. At a meeting of Slovak workers in press distribution, February 24, 1959, Janos Gajdos, head of the transportation and communications section of the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party, declared:

"Every good chief of a district post office and every district organizer must be disappointed with the present press circulation in our villages; he should try to find ways . . . of bringing the press to our peasants. Statistics show a disproportion between circulation in towns and villages. The circulation for the Party and enlightenment press is proportionately 65 percent in towns and 35 percent in villages; for the sports press, 78 percent as compared with 22 percent, although 65 percent of our people live in villages. The political aspect of press distribution in villages

is especially clear because our press has the task of propagating and strengthening Socialist production relationships and of helping in the transition from the old, individual small-scale production to progressive Socialist production on a large scale." (*Rozsirovanie Tlacte*, March 1959)

Another point emphasized by Gajdos was the necessity of increasing the circulation of *Rude Pravo* in Slovakia. So far, he said, the plan for increasing the paper's distribution had been fulfilled by only 53 percent:

"The voices attempting to explain this state of affairs by saying that *Rude Pravo* is published mainly for the Czech population and that the Slovaks have *Pravda* must be rejected. *Rude Pravo* is the organ of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the whole Party, and thus also of its regional organization, the Slovak Communist Party. Therefore our comrades working in the press distribution sector should consider it an honor to fulfill the circulation plan for *Rude Pravo* in the shortest time possible."

Discussions at the meeting disclosed that, in many districts, the Party press was virtually ignored. It was claimed, for example, that only a small percentage of teachers subscribed to the Party press, and the results of one survey showed that in the town of Puchov *Rude Pravo* had only 11 subscribers and that 30 chairmen of village Party organizations and 10 chairmen of plant organizations did not subscribe to *Pravda*; "no one reads *Zivot Strany* in Lednické Rovne."

To ensure the distribution in Slovakia of publications of a "national character" (Slovak indifference not only to *Rude Pravo* but to so-called national publications in general has been lamented frequently of late), the regime announced on November 22, that beginning January 1, 1960, a Slovak version of *Rude Pravo* would be published; whether this will affect the circulation of *Pravda* remains to be seen. Furthermore, to increase Party influence in the villages, it was also announced, by *Zemedelske Noviny* (Prague), September 17, 1959, that existing village papers in individual agricultural districts would gradually be replaced by district papers issued by district Party and national committees. The reason given was that the village papers concentrated on agricultural news to the exclusion of "everything else." Both these changes indicate that the "Socialist" press has not managed to rally the people behind the Party and that the "construction" of "Socialism" is being met, to say the least, with indifference.



"In recent years, most doctors at the polyclinic have gradually been devoting more time to each individual patient. This is my experience: while a factory doctor at CKD Sokolovo [a large machinery factory in Prague], I was able to devote four minutes of total time to each patient (which corresponds to 100 or 110 patients in eight working hours); but now, in my capacity of district physician at the polyclinic, I can devote seven and one-half minutes of total time to each patient (approximately 40 patients in five hours). What is it that has made possible this improvement in the quality of medical care by the extension of total time per patient?"

A Prague physician, writing in *ČESKOSLOVENSKÉ ZDRAVOTNICTVÍ* (PRAGUE), No. 9, October, 1959.

"I Lost A Tooth"

An essay on State medical services, from Dikobraz (Prague), October 22, 1959.

"SIT DOWN," the doctor said briskly. "Open your mouth. Which one?"

"The wisdom tooth, lower right," I stuttered.

"Forceps," the doctor called out.

I took fright. "Why the forceps? I would rather have it filled, can't you save it? . . ."

The doctor looked at a large clock on the wall. "Nonsense. Open your mouth. Quickly."

"But . . ."

"Quiet. Hold still."

"At least give me an injection!" I shouted desperately.

The doctor looked again at the wall clock and put down the forceps. "Finished," he said drily. "Come again in three weeks. You must leave now."

I was so astonished that I couldn't move. That didn't last long, but it was time enough for a seventy-year-old woman and a sick man on crutches to pass by me into the surgery and thrust themselves into the chair, for two crunching and gurgling sounds to be heard, and for the old woman and the man with crutches to slide past me out the door again.

Three weeks later I entered the waiting room again. A notice was tacked on the door of the surgery: "In view of the growing number of patients, the time available for each is reduced from two minutes and five seconds to one minute forty-three and five-tenths seconds."

Absolute quiet reigned in the waiting room. The patients stood around in a semi-circle, and the space in the middle of the room was occupied by the person whose turn was next. Most of the patients had their mouths already open, and some of them wore tennis shoes on their feet.

The loudspeaker above the surgery door blared: "Mrs. Motejzlikova, number 26, prepare for start."

Mrs. Motejzlikova is the superintendent of our apartment house. She has suffered from asthma for the last ten years and she weighs 233 pounds. But her mind is vigorous. She got off to a perfect start and returned after only one minute and 39 seconds.

The example of Mrs. Motejzlikova inspired me. When my turn came I shot out of the waiting room like greased lightning, amid murmurs of approval. But fate was against me. I stumbled on the curve behind the door and lost three valuable seconds. To make up for it I thrust myself into the chair and opened my mouth instantly, trying not to waste even a fraction of a second in small talk. Right away the doctor pulled out an upper incisor and its neighboring canine.

When I pointed out his error he nodded and said: "Next time."

"When?"

"In a month."

I wanted to object that perhaps this was a little too long to wait, but when the next patient sat down on my lap I desisted.

The month passed, and before I knew it I found myself in the waiting room again. This time I was in splendid form because I had practiced flying starts for three weeks and had spent another week doing calisthenics. I was in the chair after only three and two-tenths seconds, which I learned later was a record for this office. It seemed that nothing stood

in the way of my desired end. I caught a glimpse of the forceps, felt a sharp jerk. But the damned tooth wouldn't budge. The fifth jerk moved it about a quarter of an inch.

"Now!" I shouted.

"Right," said the doctor, looking at the clock and putting down his forceps. "Finished. Come again in two months. . . ."

Autumn arrived, and again I was at the door of the waiting room. A notice was posted on it: "Citizens, time is more precious than gold. To save valuable foreign currency, we have reduced the time per patient to 32 seconds."

"Well?" I said to the perspiring doctor.

He gripped his forceps, looked at the clock, put the forceps down. "Next year," he croaked, throwing himself upon an old woman who had just stepped over the threshold. I turned obediently to leave. "If you get inflammation of the gum, the tooth will fall out by itself," he managed to shout after me.

By leading a careful life I was able to contract parodontosis, and in less than ten years the tooth did fall out. I am sixty now and have no teeth, but my mind is happy and at rest. I have calculated that, to attain this result, the doctor used only five minutes nine and three-tenths seconds of time.



Rohac (Bratislava), October 9, 1959

Tito, now avows its desire for friendship and permits itself only muted occasional mutters in the direction of Belgrade. Tito, however, while welcoming such improvement, is in no degree willing to retract his party's independence from Moscow's orthodoxy; in a recent speech in Zagreb he flatly claimed legitimate descent from Marx and Lenin for his own party and policies, although "not dogmatically," and added that if the Soviet bloc accuses him of revisionism because of his agricultural policy, because of his refusal to throw "thousands and thousands of peasants into hard labor or into prison, collectivizing the peasants who then suffered," then indeed, yes, he is a revisionist. In any case, he said, the Yugoslavs were proud of their "revision of bad practices . . . of Stalinist methods." The divisive effect of the Yugoslav example upon Eastern Europe has long been remarked; time, events and the artifices of Soviet policy are doing nothing to soften that effect.

Poland seemed to be continuing its curious uncertain shuffle back from bold difference toward conformity; nevertheless, it continued as the one Communist country about which one must continually say "nevertheless." In a regime assault on the Catholic Church's position (and in an attempt to solve the very serious problem of the country's extraordinary birth rate), a further liberalization of the abortion law was passed, making it mandatory for doctors to provide abortions for any woman who claimed the need for one on economic grounds alone, as well as for reasons of health. Doctors who refuse to comply may be prosecuted, as may druggists who refuse to provide contraceptive devices. Nevertheless, according to Western reports, a group of Catholic deputies in Parliament felt free enough to vote against this bill, and, nevertheless, for the first time in two years, further reports stated, there was a meeting between Cardinal Wyszynski, Polish Catholic leader, and Party leader Gomulka, presumably in an attempt to soften some of the differences between them that have grown up in the three years since Church and State in Poland came to their unique *modus vivendi*.

There were further indications of the tightening of the line in Polish cultural life. Three "liberals," Andrzej Braun, Jan Strzelecki and K. T. Toeplitz, were reported dismissed from the staff of a leading literary periodical on Party orders and another, Kazimierz Brandys, was reported to have resigned. At the same time, a controversy raged around the unorthodox Marxist philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, who had published an essay, "The Priest and the Jester," linking the dogmas of Communism to the dogmas of any creed or cult, and avowing the superiority of analytical disbelief in any dogma. Kolakowski has been attacked; nevertheless, in no other bloc country could such a statement be published or discussed.

And in Bulgaria, the inevitable has happened. Bulgaria, which more than any bloc country had avowed admiration for the Chinese example of earth-shattering economic efforts and extreme "leftism," Bulgaria which had used the Chinese phrase for its "great leap forward," has now tacitly admitted, as did the Chinese, that the leap was a stumble. In industry the regime claimed near-fulfillment of its 1959 targets, but in the central and crucial area of agriculture, where the target had been an enormous 73.9 percent advance, it claimed only a 26 percent increase. Months ago the Bulgarian regime was warned by the Soviets that it must not follow the Chinese model in grandiose plans for the communization of the countryside, but now it has indeed followed that model in the disorganization of transport, in confusion of aim and in terrible effort wasted.

So in a month when official voices speak of a monolithic ideology "scientifically" superior to all others, we see again the reality of many modes, many models, many differences—the complex orchestration of reality rather than the one thin tone that dogma would have heard.

Current Developments

AREAWIDE

West German Anti-Semitism Scored

The rash of anti-Semitic outbreaks in West Germany gave the Satellite nations a new weapon with which to belabor the Adenauer government. A typical comment was this from the Prague Party organ *Rude Pravo*, January 4:

"The main responsibility for the anti-Semitic and Fascist incidents rests with the ruling circles in Bonn. It is they who hold a protective hand over the various neo-Fascist, militaristic and revanchist societies, finance them, permit them to publish numerous articles in favor of their policies. In the Bonn government itself there sit several former Nazis. . . ."

Similarly, Radio Bucharest, January 8, railed:

"The events of the last few days are like a strong reflector which throws light on the Bonn regime. These events are showing us how dangerous is the road chosen by the leading circles of the German Federal Republic which in turn are encouraged by leading circles from certain Western countries."

Eisenhower, NATO, and the Summit

The regimes' press gave short shrift to President Eisenhower's 11-nation tour, December 3-22, 1959. More coverage was accorded the NATO council meeting and the Western Big Four conference in Paris (December 14-21). Caught between the "spirit of Camp David" and the uncertainty over the results of the summit conference this spring, the Communist journalists were cautious in their evaluations of Western statesmen and policies. Radio Prague, December 9, uncovered two reasons for the Eisenhower tour: "to convince statesmen that the United States is a good partner in trade and economic relations and that the [US] is endeavoring to find a peaceful solution to world problems." To a Hungarian journalist, the only result of the American President's trip "was an agreement on the date and place of the meeting of Eastern and Western heads of State" and the recognition by the West that "the key to solving their problems is in the hands of the USSR." (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], December 25.)

In analyzing the NATO session Communist commentators concentrated on the divergencies between the French and American points of view: "The building of a common force, for which [US] General Norstad is fighting so hard, has been hit from yet another direction. The development of rockets in the Soviet Union has ended the inviolability of the American continent in case of war. European staff officers say that therefore . . . there is a chance that the United States may waver before it enters an armed conflict. 'Maybe we will be abandoned, and so we must



The angel of peace, standing on the shoulders of Soviet Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower, says: "Here I feel very well." This cartoon, from the Bulgarian satirical weekly *Sturshel* (Sofia), December 11, 1959, is a double rarity: cartoon delineations of the Soviet leader are infrequent as is, of course, the benign portrayal of the US president.

rely on our own forces.' This trend of thought is particularly popular in French military quarters."

In sum, the Soviet bloc has hailed a new era of "peaceful coexistence" without giving up the ideological struggle. The Budapest Party organ *Nepszabadsag*, December 12, stated this very clearly: "Peaceful coexistence is not a class peace. . . . For us peaceful coexistence means peaceful economic competition between the various social systems, i.e. peaceful conditions and more favorable conditions in the struggle against capitalism."

Stalin's Birthday Commemorated

All the Communist regimes with the notable exceptions of Communist China, Czechoslovakia and Albania followed Moscow's lead in evaluating the life of Josef Stalin. The Soviet Party organ *Pravda* on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of Stalin's birth, December 21, 1959, printed a lengthy editorial highly critical of Stalin's "abnormal personality." This was probably the strongest indictment of Stalin's leadership during and after the Second World War since Khrushchev's attack at the 1956 Soviet Party

Current Developments—Areawide

Congress, a speech which is still suppressed in the USSR.

After a brief introductory paragraph praising Stalin as "an eminent functionary of the [Soviet Party] and an . . . irreconcilable fighter against Tsarist absolutism and capitalism," the article concentrated on the "serious errors" in the last period of his life which "greatly harmed the cause of the Party and the people." His "errors" began in 1941 when Stalin "committed serious mistakes, among which were the incorrect assessment of the military-strategic situation of the country on the eve of the war and the underrating of the armed attack against the USSR that was being prepared by Fascist Germany."

As *Pravda* saw it, the Second World War gave Stalin an opportunity to "restrict Soviet and Party democracy." But soon these "temporary deviations from democracy" turned into "permanent norms of State and Party life." The cause of "Socialist construction" was also affected by these "deviations" stemming from Stalin's incorrect thesis—"the greater the progress of the Soviet Union towards Socialism, the more acute the class struggle becomes." This thesis served as a justification of "mass repressions."

It was while the "enormous victories of Socialism" were taking place that "the cult of the personality of Stalin gradually developed." The "successes of the Communist Party and the Soviet people were attributed to him personally," and soon Stalin began to believe in his own "infallibility." As final proof that "the cult of personality" was prompted by "personal negative features" in Stalin's character, Lenin's 1922 "Letter to the Congress," his so-called "last testament," was quoted at length:

"Comrade Stalin, after taking over the position of Secretary-General, has accumulated in his hands immeasurable power, and I am not certain whether he will always be able to use this power with the required care. . . . Stalin is too rude, and this defect . . . becomes a fault which cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of Secretary-General. Because of this I propose that the

comrades consider means by which Stalin could be removed from this position and by which another man would be appointed to this post, a man who would [show] . . . greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater politeness, and a more attentive attitude towards comrades, less capriciousness, etc."

As a consequence of his "abnormal" personality, Stalin seriously damaged "the cause of Socialist construction as well as the interests of the people, and impeded the progress of the country."

Chinese Comrades Differ

The Communist Chinese official organ *Jenmin Jihpao* (Peiping) called Stalin's "mistakes" a secondary feature of his life and played up his "greatness." No hint was given that any differences existed between Stalin and Lenin. Furthermore, Stalin's writings on agriculture, largely repudiated by Soviet Premier Khrushchev, were singled out for special commendation. (*The New York Times*, January 3.)

In Eastern Europe the Czechoslovak Party organ *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 21, also skimmed over any "mistakes" Stalin might have made, and wrote a paean of praise to him as "an outstanding organizer and statesman [as well as] a prominent theoretician."

Albania not only defended Stalin's actions but took the occasion to attack "Yugoslav revisionism." The Tirana daily *Zeri i Popullit* reviewed Stalin's 1948 charges against the Yugoslav Communists. Refusing to heed Stalin's "comradely words" urging them "to mend the error of their ways," the Yugoslavs set off on "a road of treachery" and ate still pursuing "this course with the utmost zeal."

Other Satellite Reaction

Except for Poland, the remaining Soviet bloc countries



Polish Christmas cartoons: Left, "Is it true that Santa Claus loves children?" Right, the young man to Santa Claus, "Okay, knock off the throne-speech and drag out the present, I got to get to a party."

Szpilki (Warsaw), December 20-27, 1959

published articles along the lines of the *Pravda* piece, although couched in somewhat more gentle terms. The Romanian Party daily *Scinteia* (Bucharest), December 23, referred to Stalin's "coarse mistakes in connection with the cult of personality," and mentioned Lenin's "last testament" but merely as giving a "hint" of the bad personal character of Stalin. In Sofia, *Rabotnichesko Delo*, December 22, briskly noted Stalin's "mistakes" and the "cult of personality" but took a good deal of space to laud Khrushchev's "historic 20th Congress for overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences." The Polish Party organ *Trybuna Ludu* published no original commentary, but reprinted in full the *Pravda* article.

Christmas Celebrated

The holiday season in Eastern Europe was considerably more festive for Christmas shoppers in 1959, since the stores offered more consumer goods than in past years. In Budapest, stores were crammed and the largest department store rang up in one day sales equivalent to \$135,000. Also, for the first time in many years the government allowed the people a three-day holiday. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], December 29, 1959.)

The Prague regime concentrated on undermining the religious character of Christmas, pointing out that gifts, Christmas dinner and the traditional tree were available because of the work of the people in a Communist State—"we could never rely either on the help of 'little Jesus' or on dollar-rich uncles from abroad." The Prague Party organ *Rude Pravo*, December 25, predicted that the deco-

rated Christmas tree "free from religious superstitions" will glow that much more brightly when "man carries into the icy regions of space his boldness, his neighborly love, his comradely spirit."

In Poland churches were packed and the holidays were made festive with a goodly supply of food. An enormous sale of Christmas trees was also registered—1 million, 26 thousand sold, according to Radio Warsaw, December 26. Even at this, there was a shortage of Yule trees, but the regime was loathe to destroy scarce timber.

Polish Satire

A most noteworthy event of the season was a New Year's Warsaw television show featuring a bold political satire. The program showed puppets representing regime figures, including Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz himself. The Premier, who is balding, sang a short refrain: "There is nothing on my head; there is nothing in it either." The puppet Minister of Commerce maintained that it was always possible for him to cover up a deficit "by closing the shops," and the puppet Mayor of Warsaw asked the people "to be born, to die, and to pay taxes in the meantime." (*Le Monde* [Paris], January 2.)

In Bulgaria and Romania the Christmas holidays are not recognized by the regimes.

Tito Vaunts Yugoslav Independence

In a major address in Zagreb, December 12, President Tito flailed out at his Soviet-bloc critics in a defense of Yugoslav "revisionism" and "neutralism." He hailed the achievements of Yugoslav "Socialism," pointing out that Yugoslavia owed nothing to "them"—i.e. the Soviet-orbit Communist regimes. "Nobody can reproach us for anything. . . . They said to us from the other side: 'With American wheat and with American assistance you cannot build Socialism. You are going back to capitalism.' But no! We are here. We are today a Socialist country . . . with the energy not only of the Communists but of the whole nation which is admired by the whole world."

Reproached by the USSR for not being "internationalists," Tito replied: "Who was the first to send . . . cadres to fight in Spain against Fascism? We sent them. . . . When the attack on the Soviet Union occurred, we issued a proclamation [against Germany] the same day. . . . History recorded this, and nobody can erase it."

Turning to the specific accusation of "revisionism," the Yugoslav leader made a lengthy defense:

"Many things which they criticized [in us] in 1948 they now do themselves, making such revisions as necessary. In their case it is Socialist development and in our case it is revisionism. Yes, it is revisionism. Indeed, it is a revision of bad practices . . . of Stalinist methods of administration in which his ego was decisive everywhere, and eventually it all turned out bad. . . . But when someone says we are revisionists and that we revise Leninism-Marxism, this is not true. We are faithful disciples of Marx, Engels and Lenin, although we do not accept them dogmatically. . . . But we have their basic aim, which is to build Socialism."

Picasso and Penicillin

RADIO WARSAW, December 24, gave this report on a recent newspaper survey: "*Sztandar Mlodych* devoted two pages of its special Christmas issue to a questionnaire on our times. According to the answers published on December 24, the readers of *Sztandar Mlodych* consider Ernest Hemingway the greatest novelist; second and third place went to the French writer [Albert] Camus and to the Soviet author Mikhail Sholokhov. The majority of votes for the finest movie of our times was given to the Soviet film 'A Man's Fate.' Pablo Picasso was rated the greatest painter, and the UN building the most outstanding work of architecture. Albert Einstein was acclaimed the greatest scientist of our time, and the picture of the heretofore unseen side of the moon qualified as the most sensational photograph. Readers considered the cosmic rocket the most outstanding work of technology and the Soviet passenger jet plane TU-114 the most revolutionary means of transportation. Penicillin took first place among drugs and medicines, and France's Brigitte Bardot was awarded the title of most exciting girl of our time. Gregory Peck, followed by Gerard Philippe, received the title of Mr. Earth of the mid-20th century."



Polish Christmas cartoons. Left, the stripling, a member of the Socialist Youth League, says to Santa Claus, "I see, citizen, that you are not aware of the current trends in economic policy"; the Poles are being told that there are too many horses in their agriculture. Right, one Santa Claus to another, "Do you believe in children?"

Szpilki (Warsaw), December 20-27, 1959

In discussing Yugoslav agricultural development, which the Soviet bloc had criticized, Tito made it clear that the Yugoslav Communists would never resort to forced collectivization, although they had not renounced the ultimate goal of attaining "Socialism" in the countryside:

"Is it revisionism that, having no material means and possibilities to provide everything necessary for the development of agriculture, we allowed the cooperatives to dissolve because they were not able to live? No! But wait—we did not renounce the creation of Socialism in the rural areas. No, no! Let nobody believe it. We are taking a completely different road. We do not take land away from anybody. We progress step by step. . . . We have State farms . . . we have cooperatives which make contracts with individual peasants, and so on and so on.

"Well, this is a revision of the practice of . . . throwing thousands and thousands of peasants into hard labor or into prison, collectivizing the peasants who then suffered. . . . The question of the peasants—at which pace they will proceed—is not decisive for us anymore. What is decisive is what we do. This has already, so to speak, solved the problem of attaining Socialism in the rural areas."

Yugoslav Role in Hungarian Revolt

What has always rankled Tito has been the charge that Belgrade was in some way responsible for the Hungarian uprising in 1956. When this criticism was repeated at the recent Hungarian Party Congress, Tito felt called upon to deny the accusations:

"We shall not—before the world and history—accept blame for something we are not to blame for. If it proves necessary someday we shall put out all documents for inspection, and let it be seen where our blame lies. We are not guilty of anything . . . we can show the whole world how things went . . . yet we nevertheless support the principle that the Hungarian problem is an affair of the Hungarian people alone, and that nobody has any right to interfere.

"For instance, Comrade [Janos] Kadar says that the

Yugoslavs attack their friends [Communist] China and Albania. Swell—we attack two great powers which are their friends. But who after all attacks whom? It would be better if he had said: 'We are glad that China and Albania attack you,' and not that we attack them."

Tito concluded by stating that he would like relations with Hungary to improve, and that the situation with respect to Bulgaria and the USSR was already much improved. He also reiterated his argument that Yugoslavia's role as a bridge between the Communist and non-Communist worlds had not been undermined by the meeting between Nikita Khrushchev and US President Eisenhower. (Radio Belgrade, December 12, 1959.)

Soviet Bloc Agriculture Criticized

A country-by-country analysis of Soviet-bloc agricultural policies was published in the Ljubljana daily *Delo*, December 18. From the Yugoslav standpoint Satellite agricultural producers are not given "sufficient incentive" and the regimes "are underestimating the necessity of the self-management system in Socialism." What changes have been introduced "are similar to the measures we have introduced and because of which they are calling us 'revisionists.'" Specifically, the Yugoslav writer claimed that difficulties in Soviet bloc agricultural production have occurred because "no care has been taken to note the reaction of the producers as human beings." This has led to "economic failures and political problems."

Albanian Offensive Continues

Castigating "Yugoslav revisionism" appears to be Albanian Party boss Enver Hoxha's favorite hobby. While Yugoslav relations with other East European countries have been more cordial of late, the Albanian regime remains an intransigent enemy. Hoxha's most violent outburst came at a conference on cultural development in rural areas, December 17:

Current Developments—Areawide, Poland

"We have hated and fought against the contemporary revisionism which is represented by the Yugoslav revisionists. They are the fiercest agents of this moral degeneration. . . . Only recently the Yugoslav revisionists at their solemn meeting in Zagreb [see above] had the impudence to call their revisionist policy a Leninist policy. Lenin long ago demolished the fathers of the Yugoslav revisionists. . . . Also they should not forget that Lenin said that every dollar drips with the blood of American workers and people. It drips with blood from the bodies of the people of the world. The Yugoslav revisionists understand peaceful coexistence as an ideological coexistence with capitalism and an open door to capitalist penetration of Socialism. This is proved by all their acts, starting with the dollars which they get from the American imperialists and ending with their complete silence against imperialism. . . . (Radio Tirana, December 17.)

A formal Albanian complaint was lodged with the Yugoslav foreign office on December 22, in connection with an alleged Yugoslav violation of the agreement on water resources between the two nations. (Radio Tirana, December 23.) Yet withal, Albanian-Yugoslav relations have not completely broken down. A trade protocol for 1960 was signed in Tirana, December 29, to the value of 4 million dollars. (Radio Belgrade, December 30.)

Bulgarian Rapprochement

Although not yet sweetness and light, marked improvement in relations between Belgrade and Sofia was evident at the close of 1959. Bulgarian Party leader Todor Zhivkov in his speech before the National Assembly, December 25, declared that "ideological differences between us and the leading body of the League of Yugoslav Communists should not be an obstacle to expanding cooperation between the two countries." (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], December 27.) The largest cloud on the horizon still seems to be the acrimony surrounding Bulgarian and Yugoslav treatment of Macedonians. This issue was revived once again by the Yugoslav daily *Nova Makedonija* (Skopje), January 10, which charged Radio Sofia with perverting the Macedonian language and thus "making a caricature of the language of a nation."

Busy Line

RADIO WARSAW, December 10, reports that the newspaper *Zycie Warszawy* has instituted a new service of "audiences by telephone": "Between 5 and 6 p.m., readers of the paper can get answers to various questions pertaining to the life of the capital by calling 80525, Chairman Zygmunt Dworakowski of the Presidium of the Warsaw People's Council. *Zycie Warszawy* requests callers to refrain from dealing with personal matters or delivering long tirades. Friday, the telephone will be answered by the Deputy Minister of Transportation Jozef Popielas, and Saturday by the Minister of Internal Trade Mieczyslaw Lesz."

The Serbian Premier Milos Minic also voiced the hope that "everything which poisons the relations and causes mistrust [between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria] must be liquidated." The Serbian leader, however, urged Sofia to abandon "the chauvinism and megalomania of the greater Bulgarian bourgeoisie." (Radio Belgrade, December 30.)

Finally, cultural and economic accords were signed between Sofia and Belgrade. These included an exchange of scholarships, mutual visits of scientists and artists, and a commodity exchange 20 percent greater during 1960 than during 1959. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], December 24, 30.) Similarly, an agreement on cultural cooperation was signed between Yugoslavia and Hungary in Budapest, December 8, according to Radio Budapest of the same day.

Warsaw Expels Yugoslavs

The Yugoslav military attaché and his assistant in Warsaw were declared *personae non gratae* by the Polish government. No reasons were given for the action. The Warsaw government also informed the Yugoslavs that the projected Polish information center in Belgrade would not be opened. (Radio Belgrade, January 8.)

POLAND

Birth Control Disputed

Polish Primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński came under fire in the regime press for his condemnation of abortion and other methods of birth control. The Polish Party organ *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), January 6, quoted the Cardinal as saying: "If we know how properly to utilize our Polish land, we need have no fear—this land could provide food for not 30 but 50, 60, 80 million Poles." The journal went on to complain: "It's easy for Cardinal Wyszyński to quote such figures and to popularize unrestrained procreation as a Polish *raison d'état*, for it is not the Church that will build nurseries, kindergartens, schools, apartments and factories. . . . The State wishes to assure every citizen the right and possibility of family planning. The Catholic clergy tends toward depriving citizens of this right. This is more than intolerance. This is a blow against freedom of conscience, for which the clergy so fervently strives."

Regime ire was also directed at the Vatican for not formally confirming the appointment of Polish bishops in dioceses of the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. (*Zycie Warszawy* [Warsaw], December 11, 1959.)

Abortions Eased

The Minister of Health announced on January 11 that the sole requirement for a legal abortion in Poland is to be the simple statement by a woman that "she is in particularly difficult material circumstances which justify interruption of pregnancy." Previously, abortions were granted with a doctor's permission for reasons of health, although in some cases a patient's economic circumstances were also considered grounds for a legal abortion. (Radio Warsaw, January 12.)

Le Monde Circulation Cut

Western journals will be even harder to obtain in Poland. After banning *The New York Times* (see *East Europe*, January, p. 38), the regime announced that the independent Paris daily *Le Monde* would have its Polish distribution cut from 681 to 273 copies; this measure was allegedly taken "for reasons of economy." *Le Monde* is reputedly the most popular Western newspaper in Poland, particularly among Warsaw intellectuals. (*Le Monde* [Paris], January 10.)

Journalists Imprisoned

Polish journalists Tomasz Atkins and Aleksander Wolowski were sentenced to prison for tax evasion, according to Western sources. Atkins had been employed by the former Warsaw correspondent of *The New York Times*, A. M. Rosenthal, recently expelled, and Wolowski by the French illustrated weekly *Paris Match*. They had also been arrested in 1957, accused of espionage activities, but acquitted without a trial.

Workers' Activists Meet

"Job-hopping," resulting in over 30 percent of the labor force changing their jobs during the past year, was singled out as the most crucial problem facing Polish industry today at a conference of so-called workers' self-government organizations in Warsaw, December 11-12. Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, chairman of the Central Trade Union Council, declared that the government was prepared to take steps "to halt this excessive fluidity in the labor force," so that workers who voluntarily leave their jobs will not be hired by other enterprises. The Communist-backed "self-government conferences" replaced and swallowed up the "workers' councils," organized after October 1956 in the hope that the workers themselves would play a larger political role in Gomulka's Poland. The main speaker—Politburo member and Planning Commission chief Stefan Jedrychowski—urged the activists to "raise the incentive" of the industrial workers to increase production. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], December 12.)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"Anti-State Groups" Punished

Two illegal religious organizations have come under attack for their "subversive activities." A group calling itself the Order of Saint Lazarus was accused of preparing a party "along the lines of the West German Christian Democratic Party" with the goal of including Czechoslovakia in the "Danube subsection of the new unified Europe." Six of the "knights" of the group were tried and given sentences of up to 9 years imprisonment. (*Svobodne Slovo* [Prague], December 1.)

Another trial involved the banned Order of Saint Francis and the "Sisters of Mary." Several of these young women were prosecuted because they had disseminated

Unreal Ideas

The Yugoslav press continues to be an interesting source of information on life in Communist China. Below is an account from Peiping of how the Chinese regime combats the desires of its youth for "a wonderful, happy life," which appeared in Borba (Belgrade), Dec. 11, 1959.

THE PAST here has been summoned to be the teacher of the present. They are revising and demonstrating the past, lest those living today forget it, and so that they may understand how much better off they are today than in the past, that they may value what they have, and that they may be modest in their desires. This invocation of the past is not anything new here, incidentally. The only new thing about it is that it has lately been especially aimed at youth. Why?

"Youth has suffered little in the past," the *China Youth Daily* wrote recently. 'It has no experience of the grave struggle for life and of the class struggle. It always has some sort of unreal ideas about a wonderful, happy life. In the communes, for example, production has increased and income grown. Youth inevitably is anxious to indulge in entertainment and satisfaction. Therefore, after the 'rich harvest' some young people wrongly felt that 'the time has come to entertain themselves' and that they could freely spend their money. These are bourgeois ideas which make their appearance in the transition period and spoil the young people. That is why they must be educated, and bourgeois influence must be combated.

"A few days ago, the *Workers' Daily* wrote the following about the situation among youth in a Shanghai machine factory: 'A great many young people do not know how to organize their lives. Some of the young workers spend the greater part of their free time sleeping; others just roam the streets; still others—a smaller number—have been infected by bourgeois ideas and think only of better clothing and feeding themselves and even abandon themselves to immorality. These problems inflict serious harm on the sound spirit of the young workers and their attitude toward production.'

"That is why efforts are now made to wage the struggle for youth's proper education and the eradication of undesirable ideas and features on a very wide front. The measures taken are various. In all youth organizations, discussions are held for a month or longer on the subject 'why must we live our rich days in a poor way?' Lectures are organized, the biographies of young heroes who laid down their lives for the homeland are recounted, the examples of outstanding young heroes of labor are analyzed, and so forth. But one of the most important and most effective methods, they say, in the education of the youth is the comparison of past and present."

Current Developments—Czechoslovakia

printed matter containing "anti-State" material and were given prison sentences ranging from one to 5 years. *Svobodne Slovo*, December 8, in reporting the trial, commented: "[The defendants] were talented, conscientious, hard-working. . . . Yet the blindness of their religious fanaticism did not permit them to answer the question of the people's judge: what would happen if they succeeded in winning all the girls for their order? The argument is that there would be no marriages, no families and no children. Is this not against the laws of nature?"

Prague Denies Poison Plot

"Sheer concoction" and "hoax" were the terms Prague used to describe the recent accusation made by the European Director of Radio Free Europe that an official of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Salzburg had tried to poison

the United States. Radio Prague, December 27, declared that "it is not exactly elating [for the US] to look into a mirror and behold its colonialist features." Nevertheless, the exhibition "is not aimed against the United States as such, but only against those forces which, covering themselves under a democratic aegis, in actual fact pursue inhuman aims."

"Peace Priests" Meet

The Communist-backed All-State Peace Congress of the Roman Catholic clergy met in Prague, December 15-16, 1959. In the main address Minister of Health Josef Plojhar, an excommunicated priest, roundly condemned American Cardinals Spellman and Cushing for their "hostile attitude" toward the Soviet Union. Plojhar declared that Czechoslovak Catholics "condemn all attempts to



A line to buy apples in front of a Prague fruit and vegetable store at Christmas time. This year there was a particular shortage of apples, oranges and lemons at the holiday season.

Cartoon from *Dikobraz* (Prague), December 21, 1959

employees of RFE in Munich. The Party organ *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 22, 1959, vehemently declared: "This provocation only further confirms the immorality, lack of character, and falsity of the entire criminal activity of the so-called Radio Free Europe. All those who lent themselves to spreading its new slanders and lies in the past few days should realize that similar actions, aimed against easing international tension, exclusively serve the sworn enemies of peace and international understanding." The press and news media in the other Soviet bloc countries echoed the Prague line.

US Protests Czechoslovak Exhibit

An official US protest was lodged with the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry against an exhibition in Prague depicting the United States as "the last and worst of the colonialists." Department of State spokesman Lincoln White described the show as "pretty barbaric." The strong American reaction was due in large part to pictures of unknown origin showing severed heads with American soldiers in the background and prisoners in an American "concentration camp." General Douglas MacArthur was described as a "mass murderer." The ostensible reason for the exhibit was to portray the plight of under-developed areas. (*The New York Times*, December 16.)

Czechoslovak reaction was to defend these attacks on

disturb the tranquil trend of international life, especially the revanchist attacks of the German Federal Republic and Adenauer's policy of supporting the dark forces plotting a new war." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], December 17.)

An open attack on the Western Catholics was broadcast over Radio Prague, December 17, in which Western Catholicism was accused of "holding on to the positions of the cold war insofar as [its] attitude toward Czechoslovak Catholics is concerned" and urged to "stop shedding those crocodile tears over your brothers behind the so-called iron curtain." The Congress concluded with an oath which would "guide believers to do good work for the prosperity of the country" and a message from Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev paying tribute to the clergy's "peace committee."

Resistance to Territorial Reform

In the planned reorganization of regions into a smaller number of "oblasts"—based on the Soviet model—there will necessarily be a reduction in the number of officials administering them. Czechoslovak President Antonin Novotny declared that the new organization would "save many workers" from administrative tasks and therefore "fill all the communities, all the national committees, with capable people." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], November 13, 1959.) Although the regime did not openly admit that resistance to the new plan stemmed from recalcitrant bu-

Current Developments—Czechoslovakia, Hungary

reacrats, it did complain that "local patriotism" was standing in the way of the reorganization, "placing partial interests of individual groups . . . above the interests of the whole community." This was condemned as "an anti-social phenomenon, incompatible with and absolutely alien to Socialist ideology as are all the other petit bourgeois relics of egotism and selfish behavior." (*Rude Pravo*, Dec. 17.)

Parliament Approves New Bills

State holidays and time off will no longer be subtracted from workers' annual paid vacations, according to a law approved by the National Assembly, December 18. The basic vacation is two calendar weeks per year; after 5 years of uninterrupted employment with one employer the worker is entitled to three weeks' vacation; and at the end of 15 years of uninterrupted employment with one employer the employee is allowed a full month's holiday.

Changes in the rank system among Czechoslovak Army NCO's were also voted. The Soviet model, introduced in 1950, has been abandoned, and the new system is more closely modelled after the army of the First Republic (1919-1938). (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], December 19, 1959.)

HUNGARY

Collectivization Drive Continues

By mid-January the Kadar regime claimed to have added another million acres to its collective farm sector, in the new campaign which began last October. (*The New York Times*, January 17.) Encouraged by the success of last winter's drive, which extended the collectivized area from 14.6 percent of the arable land to 36.6 percent, the regime has sent its organizing squads into counties which were relatively untouched before. Latest reports state that the arable land belonging to the "Socialist sector"—collective farms and State farms—amounts to 57.5 percent of the country's total.

Vas County in the Transdanubian region has 13 new collective villages with 1,500 families, according to *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), December 10. In March 1959 it had been 27.8 percent collectivized; the newspaper stated that the proportion of arable land in collectives had now risen to 34.6 percent. In Zala County, where only 14.5 percent of the arable land had been in collectives last spring, 22 new collective villages had been formed according to *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), December 12. In the Transdanubian county of Somogy, an area of prosperous smallholders, the collectivized sector had risen from 41.6 percent of the land in March 1959 to about 70 percent at the end of December, not counting the 15 percent belonging to State farms. (*Somogyi Neplap*, January 1.)

Collectivization Gains Church Support

A major regime success was registered when the Hungarian Catholic Bench of Bishops issued a pastoral letter, read in all churches on December 31, offering guarded support for the collectivization program. The carefully phrased

The Inner Directed

THIS PRESCRIPTION for a good Party worker was given by Hungarian Communist boss Janos Kadar at the recent Hungarian Party Congress:

"The best workers are not always those who, half-way through a sentence [of instruction], not even waiting to hear it out, jump right to their feet shouting 'Hurrah, right, we agree on everything.' The best workers are those who listen to the end, reflect, weigh the problem of implementation, and then say, 'We approve, we agree, we shall carry it out.'" (Radio Budapest, December 4, 1959.)

statement read as follows: "The victories gained, thanks to the sacrificial work of our people and the measures taken by the leaders of our State for the good of our people, have made us all rejoice. Our peasantry is setting up new cooperatives in collective farming, and the cooperative peasantry, as well as individual farmers, are working to raise the living standard through increasing production."

The pastoral letter also praised the regime for its benevolent attitude toward the Church during 1959: "During the year which is drawing to a close we have been striving to create and maintain good relations between Church and State, and we have experienced similar intentions on the part of the representatives of the State."

Circular letters from the Reformed and Lutheran Churches were less restrained in their praise of the recent collectivization drive, which was termed "a pressing agricultural task to make the common cultivation of the land general, to consolidate further the old farmers' cooperatives, and to set up new ones." The Lutheran bishops virtually

Something New, Something Blue

A SPLENDID INNOVATION, a welcome change from the drearily familiar wedding ceremony, has been reported from the village of Otice, in Czechoslovakia. The trail-blazers were Josef Volosky, popular young tractor driver on a collective farm, and Maria Obrusnikova, attractive young leader of a platoon of farm workers on the same collective, who were fused into one amidst the jubilation of their fellow collective farmers. The new and improved ceremony was described by *Nova Svoboda* (Ostrava), October 29, 1959; sentimental sobs are clearly audible in its motherly old voice:

"The collective band played . . . and at the end the newly-weds made their mutual collective vows.

" 'I promise,' said Josef, 'that I will drive the tractor in the fields still faster.' 'And I,' promised Marie, 'will see to it with my group that still more wheat ripens in our fields.'

"The others loudly applauded their promises."

As who would not?

echoed the Party line: "Our peasantry . . . is reverting now to a production system in which we have to put the conception of 'ours' over that of 'mine.' The bread of all of us and the individual prosperity of our agricultural brothers depend on the extent to which they can overcome individual selfishness and on the good will with which they can serve—by establishing and being prepared to perform communal work—the good of the community. Undoubtedly communal farming is the road of the future. After transitory difficulties our village population will experience the advantages of this system and will find joy in this common work. The members of our congregation should boldly step forward on the road of communal farming." (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], January 4.)

Subsidies Retained

All denominations of Hungarian churches will receive the same subsidies in 1960 as they did last year, according to Radio Budapest, January 4. Agreements signed with the Protestant sects in 1948 and with the Roman Catholic hierarchy in 1950 envisaged steadily diminishing State financial support over a period of years. Since 1957, however, scheduled cuts have not been made.

Cabinet Changes

Appointed as new Minister of Agriculture was Party Central Committee member Pal Losonczy, chairman of the country's most successful collective farm, in the village of Barcs. The former minister, Imre Dogei, was made Ambassador to Communist China and North Vietnam. The Presidential Council also named Rezso Nyers as Finance Minister, replacing Istvan Antos who died recently. (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], January 14.)

Minister Dies

Hungarian Finance Minister Istvan Antos died in Budapest, January 5, after a stomach operation, according to Radio Budapest of the same day. A member of the Central Committee, he had been Minister of Finance since May 1957.

Party Members Expelled

Eleven Party members were expelled shortly before the Seventh Party Congress in December. Two of the expulsions have apparently no political significance; accusations of immoral behavior and corruption were the ostensible causes for the action. The charges leveled against the other nine were all of a political character. Most prominent among the expellees was General Laszlo Hegyi, former Chief of Staff (from the summer of 1956 to February 1957). He was accused of abandoning the military unit placed under his command during the 1956 Revolt. Ervin Reti, foreign policy editor of the Budapest daily *Esti Hirlap*, and Agnes Heller, former editor of the "Hungarian Philosophical Review," were also deprived of their Party membership, charged with "revisionism."

Three others were expelled for their connection with an "anti-State organization" which had allegedly been formed by Sandor Fekete, former editor of the pre-Revolt Party paper *Szabad Nep*, and Professor Ferenc Merczi. They had



The Soviet practice of "polytechnicism" in education—the emphasis on practical training—is becoming increasingly widespread in the area. Above, a class in book-binding in a Budapest girls' school.

Hungarian Review (Budapest), December 1959

been sentenced respectively to 9 and 10 years imprisonment in April 1959 (see *East Europe*, May, p. 49). The three: Ferenc Fekete, chief editor of *Kozgazdasagi Szemle*, an economic review; Mrs. Gyorgy Csanadi, ex-wife of the First Deputy Minister of Communications; and Laszlo Miskolczi, a teacher of Marxism-Leninism. (*Partelet* [Budapest], November 1959.)

Also expelled from the Party was Janos Galos, the director of the country's largest thermal power plant. He was said to have "supported the counterrevolutionaries, nominated a class enemy . . . as chairman of the workers' council" and later "hampered the reorganization of the Party." The Party daily *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), December 15, 1959, took care to point out that "the errors of director Galos can serve as a lesson to others"—i.e., primarily, workers who rose to become members of the managerial class.

Polytechnic Education Expanded

Soviet-style polytechnic education—academic studies combined with on-the-job training—was introduced into Hungarian secondary schools last year on the basis of one out of every 6 school days to be spent in the factory or on the farm. Next fall, 2 school days per week will be utilized for practical training in the first year of high school and 3 days per week of manual labor will be required for the remaining 3 years. (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest] December 11, 1959.)

Pal Ilku, Deputy Minister of Education, maintained that despite the reduction of teaching time in academic subjects, "the students obtain better results not only in the social sciences, but also in the humanities [because] the physical work allows a certain relaxation of tension from strenuous intellectual subjects." (Radio Budapest, December 23.)

Housing Decree

A long-term housing plan was announced in *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) on January 8. Calculated to ease the present housing shortage, the 15-year plan calls for one

Current Developments—Romania, Bulgaria

million new apartments by 1975, 250,000 of which are to be completed by 1965. The State will build 60 percent of them, with the remainder left to private initiative. Efforts are to be concentrated in Budapest, where the overcrowding is most severe.

In the meantime, the government will try to find more space in the existing facilities by requiring apartment dwellers who have surplus space to pay additional rent.

ROMANIA

Budget for 1960

Finance Minister Aurel Vijoli presented the draft budget for 1960 to the Grand National Assembly on December 26. The details, published by *Scinteia* (Bucharest) on January 3, compare with last year as follows (in billions of lei):

	1959 Planned	1959 Realized	1960 Planned
Revenue	51.8	50.6	56.8
National economy	47.2	46.3	52.9
Taxes on population	4.6	4.2	3.8
Expenditures	51.0	47.9	55.9
National economy	28.9	28.8	33.5
Social and cultural	11.9	12.0	13.4
Education	4.0	—	3.3
Science and culture		—	0.9
Social insurance	6.3	—	3.4
Health and sports		—	3.0
Social welfare		—	0.9
Family allowances	—	—	1.6
State administration	1.5	—	1.5
Defense	3.6	—	3.5
Reserve fund	3.3	—	2.5
Surplus	0.8	2.7	0.8

The expanded revenues and expenditures, 12.1 and 16.5 percent respectively above the 1959 level, are based on a national income which is slated to grow 12.5 percent during 1960. The budget also reflects increased expenditures of 4.7 billion lei for the wage, pension and social insurance increases of last August. Expenditures during 1959 were significantly below the planned budget, leaving a surplus over three times the size originally slated.

In Vijoli's address to the Assembly, he said that revenue from the "Socialist sector" would be 14.1 percent higher than in 1959 and would account for 93.2 percent of the total income. Total investment this year, the Minister said, will reach 23.5 billion lei, of which 14.8 billion will be supplied by the State budget and the remainder by enterprises, organizations and banks. Investment in agriculture is to total 4.4 billion lei, an increase of 25 percent over the amount realized in 1959—which itself was 20.6 percent above the 2.9 billion lei allotted in last year's budget. Long-

term credits to collective farms and agricultural associations are to rise by 40 percent; and 1.2 billion lei are allocated to the Machine Tractor Stations, or 20 percent more than in last year's budget.

Ministerial Changes

By governmental decree the Ministry of Construction and Building Materials has been abolished and a new Ministry of Forestry created. Previously the forestry department had been attached to the Ministry of Agriculture; the increase in production of the timber industry and of agriculture necessitated the change, according to a report by the official Yugoslav news service, December 26. The new head of the Forestry Ministry is Mihail Suder, previously Minister of Construction and Building. As a consequence of this action, the building trade will be decentralized and administered at the regional and local level.

Deputy Premier and Minister of Education and Culture Atanase Joja has been relieved of his duties. Although no reason was given by Radio Bucharest when it announced this decision, January 10, last December Joja was appointed President of the Romanian Academy which is responsible for scientific and technological developments. Ilie Murgulescu, Minister of Education from 1953 to 1956, replaced Joja as minister but not as Deputy Premier.

BULGARIA

Zhivkov and the Balkans

Conciliatory and threatening words were blended together to prepare a familiar Bulgarian soufflé for Greek and Turkish consumption. Party boss Todor Zhivkov, in an interview appearing in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), December 24, 1959, repeated his previous offers to sign a non-aggression pact with Greece, to establish a denuclearized zone in the Balkans, and to have a "summit meeting" of Balkan leaders.

In his speech in the National Assembly on December 25, Zhivkov struck a tougher pose. Referring to Greek demands for reparations, he said: "They [the Greeks] issue ultimatums to us to pay reparations without considering counterreparations. . . . If the Greek leaders seriously intend to settle the pending financial questions existing between us . . . there is only one sensible thing to do—sit down at a table and discuss these controversial problems, and to reach an agreement on them by taking into account the interests of both countries." He also envisaged rocket-launching pads on Bulgarian soil as a reply to similar Greek or Turkish action in this respect.

His most dramatic statement came when he copied Soviet leader Khrushchev's offer of "total disarmament." This policy would be contingent on similar agreements concluded with the other Balkan states: "Why shouldn't we transform the Balkan peninsula into the first region in which the idea of total disarmament is implemented by concluding at the same time non-aggression pacts between the Balkan countries? What large sums we could devote, in this case, to the development of the economy and cul-



An Albanian peasant; illustration for an article on Albania in a Czechoslovak periodical. *Kuety* (Prague), December 17, 1959

ture of the Balkan peoples and to the improvement of their well-being!" (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, December 27.)

Greek Reaction

Once again Athens rejected the proposal for a non-aggression pact between Bulgaria and Greece as well as general disarmament in the Balkans. Regarding the breakdown in reparations talks, Greece blamed Bulgaria for bringing up "irrelevant Bulgarian claims against Greece" which led to the "inevitable failure of the discussions." (Radio Athens, December 30.)

Report on the "Big Leap"

The National Assembly, which met December 21-26, heard Party boss Todor Zhivkov herald the achievements of 1959, the first year of the "big leap forward" which had aimed at multiplying Bulgaria's economic output in several years. The preliminary data revealed by Zhivkov and other speakers at the Assembly suggested that the first stride had fallen short of its goal. Zhivkov told the delegates that production in industry had climbed 25 percent, or nearly to the target of 27.8 percent; but in agriculture—the most important sector of the Bulgarian economy—production had increased by only 26 percent as compared to the enormous increase of 73.9 percent in the total value of production called for by the Plan. National income, said by Zhivkov to have risen 17.3 percent in 1959, had also fallen far short of the 34 percent scheduled.

The speakers at the Assembly avoided drawing pessimistic conclusions; the general tone was one of exhortation to buckle down and work harder in the coming year. But

the Plan for 1960, presented in outline, showed that the regime was quietly withdrawing from some of the astronomical aims originally set. Total industrial output is to rise by 15.3 percent, and agricultural production by 32 percent. Capital investment is to increase by roughly 26 percent, with a record share, 15.8 percent of the total, going to agriculture. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], December 26, 1959.)

Budget for 1960

The State budget for 1960, presented to the National Assembly by Finance Minister Kiril Lazarov, provides for a 15.2 percent increase in revenues and a 16.5 percent rise in expenditures. Details of the budget law passed by the Assembly (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], December 26) compare with last year's planned and realized budget as follows (in billions of leva):

	1959 Planned	1959 Realized	1960 Planned
Revenue	27.1	27.1	31.2
National economy	24.4	24.4	24.4
Turnover tax	7.8	7.4	7.5
Profit of enterprises	4.7	4.7	6.1
Others	12.2	12.2	14.6
Income tax from cooperatives and farms	—	0.5	0.7
Revenue from MTS	—	0.7	0.8
Revenues from the population	2.6	2.6	2.9
Direct taxes	1.2	1.2	1.4
Expenditures	26.9	26.8	30.8
National economy	17.5	17.4	20.2
Social and cultural	5.6	5.5	6.6
Education	1.8	1.7	2.2
Science, art, culture	0.6	0.6	0.7
Health and recreation	1.0	1.0	1.1
Social security	2.2	2.2	2.6
National defense	1.7	—	1.8
Administration	0.6	0.6	0.7
Unspecified	1.5	—	1.5
Surplus	0.2	0.2	0.3

The budget, although ambitious, demonstrates the lowering of economic sights for 1960 compared with 1959. Expenditures for the national economy, the key item, will grow only 15.4 percent as against a 57.6 percent expansion in 1959. Revenue from turnover taxes, one of the largest sources of income for the State, will increase only slightly over the 1959 realized level; its share in total revenue is declining. Profits from enterprises, on the other hand, will assume a greater role. Another growing contributor to the State revenue, according to the Finance Minister, is the State Savings Bank which is expected to increase its deposits from 5.7 to 7.1 billion *leva* during 1960. Lazarov noted that saving had become "especially brisk" among the collective farmers.

Expenditures by the local People's Councils will total 8.0 billion *leva*, a slight increase over 1959 when their

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budget was expanded more than two fold as a result of their greater role in the administration of economic affairs.

Reform in Wages and Norms

The Party Central Committee issued a decree three days before the New Year providing for a three-stage wage increase, varying from 6 to 28 percent, as well as a large-scale revision of work norms during 1960. The scope of the December 29 decree suggests a major remapping of the whole system of remuneration, similar to the revisions now planned or under way in other countries of the area. By October, 1960, the present minimum monthly pay of 400 *leva* will be raised to 500 *leva* for workers and to 470 *leva* for administrative employees. Beginning in April, increases ranging from 12 to 25 percent will be granted in the mining, construction and land transportation industries. In July and October wage increases will follow in two other groups of industries. Total cost of the wage boost will be 800 million *leva* in 1960, or nearly 2 billion *leva* on an annual basis, compared with the 380 million *leva* which the regime spent on the last wage increase in 1957.

A year ago in January 1959, Party boss Zhivkov had promised to increase the monthly minimum to 600 *leva*. At the Assembly meeting in December, Zhivkov reiterated the promise but stressed that the increase must take place gradually. The program would come about "in the course of five or six years, mainly during the period between 1961 and 1965." The present pay boost follows similar concessions in neighboring Romania last August as well as a recent 10 percent wage increase in "revisionist" Yugoslavia.

The wage increases are to be accompanied by a revision of the bonus and incentive system in industry. Production norms will be increased so that part of the present premiums "are included in the basic salary of the worker." This means that premiums which the worker previously received in addition to his basic wage will be included in the general wage increase, while premiums will be harder to get under the new, stiffer norms. The reform program also includes the revision of pay scales "so that salaries of lower managers will not be less than those of highly qualified workers." (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], December 29, 1959.)

Yugov-Stoica Meeting

Anton Yugov, Bulgarian Premier, visited Romania, December 16-20, 1959. During talks with his Romanian counterpart Chivu Stoica, a protocol was signed which stipulated that economic exchanges between the two countries would be three to four times larger by 1965 than in 1959. The accord also provided for: the establishment of a permanent mixed commission for economic and scientific cooperation; Romanian development of oil prospecting in Bulgaria; collaboration for the production of iron ore and concentrates in Bulgaria as well as cables, insulators and rolled metal "for the needs of both nations." (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], December 22, 1959.)

Pension Increase

Those who have "actively fought against Fascism and capitalism" are to be rewarded by an increase in pensions. In Communist-ruled Bulgaria years of employment prior to September 1944 cannot be used as qualification for a higher stipend; under the new law, however, the "Fascist fighters" will be able to count this period of employment, irrespective of the nature of their work. (Radio Sofia, December 25, 1959.)

TV Comes to Sofia

Although no television sets are manufactured in Bulgaria, the Sofia radio-TV station was officially inaugurated December 26, 1959. At a special meeting to mark the occasion Minister of Transportation and Communications Dancho Dimitrov stated that Bulgarian-made television sets would be produced in 1960, and that within a few years, not only Sofia workers but workers throughout the country would be able to watch programs originating in Sofia. (Radio Sofia, December 26.) Sets presently imported from Hungary, USSR, Poland and East Germany will retail at 2,200 and 3,500 *leva* (6.80 *leva* to the dollar, official rate). (*Zemедelsko Zname* [Sofia], December 12.)

(*Stomma's Warning*—continued from page 11)

"No reasonable and politically responsible person will dispute the political leadership of the Party in our country. But the Party should put a creative sense into this leadership. The population demands more competent people [in the administration]. . . . The last elections to the provincial national councils were an occasion to introduce more competent and valuable people into the State administration. Unfortunately this occasion was not properly exploited. Certainly a greater percentage in the administration of non-Party men representing high qualifications will not weaken the political leadership of the Party; on the contrary, by proper administration they will only strengthen the government's prestige. This is how we understand the realization of the slogan: self-government.

"As regards the changes in the government, we decided to abstain from voting. . . . We are a group of non-Party deputies; we are not a political party, and we have no aspirations in this direction.

"Recently we reported to the authorities our many reservations as regards the policy toward the Catholic Church. The list of our demands in this respect is long. We do not want to discuss them here. We should like to see direct negotiations between the representatives of the Government and the Church. . . . This is really an urgent social problem. The removal of the existing difficulties is indispensable for the consolidation of the atmosphere of internal peace and for the deepening of the nation's unity; it is indispensable for the mobilization of the nation's forces for the carrying out of important economic tasks."

The Wu Yen Scandal

A Yugoslav correspondent's report on literary life in Communist China (from Politika [Belgrade], December 20, 1959):

Peiping, Dec. 19—The Chinese writer Wu Yen, until yesterday almost unknown, overnight achieved the fame of the notorious Herostratos of Ephesos. He did not set fire to a wonderful temple but instead published an article entitled "Talent is Necessary in Writing" in the Tientsin journal New Harbor. Three months after this article was published Wu Yen found himself in the fore of the discussions in Peiping literary and political circles. This followed a period in which the slogan "mass writing" had been very popular and in which hundreds of thousands and millions of folksongs, ballads, short plays and novels as well as historical pamphlets saw the light.

Faced with this abundance of new works and new names, Wu Yen decided to set forth this opinion of this kind of literary production and of literary creativity generally:

"I think that not even in a Communist society will everybody be capable of being a writer. Certainly many more will engage in writing but still not everybody will be able to write. The reason is simple—among different people there will always be different endeavors and different interests. If a man is to engage in writing, he must have a special gift, just as a scientist who deals with interplanetary flights must have a special talent. Neither the one nor the other is given to all people in the world.

"It is said that 'literary authorship is not the product of some sort of mystery.' This is a reminder that man should not underrate his ability, should not be discouraged when comparing himself with others, should not be disappointed and should not hesitate to create if he feels within himself the need for artistic expression. But this cannot in any way signify that talent is absolutely unnecessary for successful literary work. It is also said that 'we must be bold, think boldly and act boldly' which is also very correct and quite proper, provided boldness in thinking and acting rest on some real and powerful basis.

"Writing is doubtless the product of the creative expression of talent, of experience in life, of human feelings and of knowledge accumulated and nurtured for years. To insist on talent alone is as unacceptable as the other extreme—of denying that creative talent has any role and value—is harmful.

"There are people among us nowadays who cannot even write a decent letter, yet this does not stop them from being carried away by the title 'writer' and from stating publicly that they actu-

ally intend to become writers. There are also people, especially among the young generation, whose general background and experience in life are more than poor, yet they state boldly that they will write a novel . . . about the 'experience' of the preceding 20 years.

"Does all this mean that writing should be a monopoly and that writing and writers ought to occupy a special, privileged place in society? Certainly not, for writing is not the privilege of the 'upper class.' Even if this were desirable, writing could not be a monopoly. Is there, perhaps, a tendency to curb the initiative of the masses and to kill undiscovered talent? Certainly not, because the masses have every right to develop their initiative. You will never kill genuine talent with a newspaper article, anyway. Well, what then is your aim, somebody may ask. Perhaps you would like to pour cold water on the heads of some people? I would reply that this has more or less been my intention, because cold water can sometimes have a beneficial effect on feverish heads."

This is almost the whole substance of Wu Yen's article, quoted here not word for word but without distortion. How did it happen that almost 3 months passed before there was a reply to the views published by Wu Yen, to his appraisal of the products of "mass writing" and his notions of the role of talent in creative work? This is a question to which an answer must be sought against the whole background of the general trends in China and of the so-called "right-wing opportunist months" of this summer.

Eventually an article did appear in the People's Daily on Nov. 3 containing stringent criticism of Wu Yen's views, to the effect that his theories about talent and creative work constituted "bourgeois notions of literature and the arts" diametrically opposed to the line of the Chinese Communist Party, and that their basic aim was "to pour cold water on the creative activity of the broad masses." Then articles and replies followed in other newspapers and periodicals, each of which subjected the unfortunate Wu Yen and his ideas of creative talent and literary inspiration to the most stringent criticism.

Workers and peasants possess the greatest talent for creative work, says a critic in the trade union paper Kung Jen Jih Pao, and to think differently, he goes on, would mean to strike a blow at the broad masses' literary activities and to endorse entirely bourgeois views of literature and the arts. Long live the literary creative activity of the masses, says the Peiping Jih Pao, in the heading of an editorial. It says that the great achievements the broad masses have scored in writing new folksongs have no parallel in China's history. Men like Wu Yen, the paper adds, do not believe in the wisdom and creative strength of the masses, and the views they hold can only be the views of right-wing opportunists and bourgeois right-wingers in literary circles.

Recent and Related

Russian Duet, by Willie Snow Ethridge (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959, 313 pp., \$3.95). Mrs. Ethridge, wife of the distinguished Louisville publisher, is the author of nine other books and numerous articles. This book is a charmingly written account of a journey to the Soviet Union which she made in the summer of 1958 with Nila, her Russian-born companion, whose biography Mrs. Ethridge wrote three years ago. Rather than play the pundit and add one more volume to the literature of amateur Sovietology, she offers an intimate, entertaining portrayal of present-day Russia, written with humor, vividness, and a human touch. The two women traveled from Leningrad to Moscow, to Odessa and Stalingrad, everywhere talking to people of various types, always alert to note an amusing incident, an unusual sight, a characteristic feature of everyday Russian life: the public bath, the opera, the marketplace, the orphanage, a Russian wedding, etc. The author's observations, although light in tone, offer the reader some interesting aperçus of Soviet Russia and its citizens.

A Day in Spring, by Ciril Kosmac, translated by F. S. Copeland from the Slovenian "Pomladni Dan" (New York: London House & Maxwell, 1959, 205 pp., \$3.75). Mr. Kosmac, a Slovene film director and author, was born in 1910 in the Eastern Alps, a territory fought over in World War I by Austrians and Italians, and in World War II by the Yugoslav Partisans and their Italian and German opponents. Persecuted by the Italians for his patriotic views, he escaped across the border to Yugoslavia in 1931. In this autobiographical novel the author recounts the return to his native land after fifteen years of exile and describes the people now living in Slovenia. The plot is a tragic love affair of the first World War, re-enacted twenty years later in similar circumstances, which brings to mind the tragedies and similarities of the two World Wars.

You Are All Alone, by Jozsef Kovago (New York: Praeger, 1959, 295 pp., \$6.00). Jozsef Kovago, twice freely elected Mayor of Budapest, recounts the events of the Hungarian Revolt and the dramatic personal story of his own activities. Of particular interest is the fact that this is the first book written by an

important non-Communist leader in those events. Elected Mayor right after the last war, Jozsef Kovago was later arrested by the Communists and spent more than six agonizing years in prison. Released only a few weeks before the outbreak of the Revolution, he took active part in the movement to restore the multiparty system in Hungary, working to reorganize the Smallholders Party. On November 1, 1956, he was again elected Mayor of Budapest. Four days later Soviet tanks brutally crushed the Revolution and Mr. Kovago, after a few last efforts to save some of the gains of the Revolt, escaped into Austria. He now lives in Wilmington, Delaware, and is Vice-Chairman of the Assembly of Captive European Nations.

The Kronstadt Rebellion, by Emanuel Pollack (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1959, 98 pp., \$3.00). The Kronstadt Rebellion, which took place in 1921, was the only organized armed revolt against the dictatorship of the Soviet Communist Party. Led by the sailors and officers of two Baltic fleet ships, leaders of the Kronstadt Red Army units, and heads of the local Soviet, the rebellion ended in a bloody suppression. Mr. Pollack's short book is a documented record of these dramatic events. The author is on the faculty of the New School for Social Research, and director of Russian language broadcasts for New York's Radio Station WHOM. Bibliography, index.

Stalin and The Soviet Communist Party, by Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov (New York: Praeger, 1959, 379 pp., \$6.00). "Stalin will go down in history not only as a tyrant and Grand Inquisitor but also as a phenomenal tactician, strategist, and master of the science of power. The essence of Stalinism, as practiced by himself and his pupil Khrushchev, is the technology of power." This is the principal theme of Mr. Avtorkhanov's new book which combines personal recollections and historical research, utilizing such primary sources as the minutes of Party conferences and congresses, reports of Central Committee meetings, and the files of the Party press. Most thoroughly covered is the decade from 1928 to 1938, when Stalin converted the Party into an apparatus of personal dictatorship. The author describes the role played by the great purges of the 1930's

in eliminating actual and potential enemies, and shows the vast and intricate machinery set up to control the thoughts and acts of the Soviet people. The final section of the book deals with the impact of the war on the Stalinist apparatus, Stalin's weakening grip, the inner-Party struggle for succession to control, and the nature of the new regime of Nikita Khrushchev. In the last chapter, Mr. Avtorkhanov covers events up to 1959, and the problems now facing the post-Stalin leadership. This book was published for the Institute for the Study of the USSR, of which Mr. Avtorkhanov was one of the founders. Bibliography, index.

Science and Technology in Contemporary War, by Maj. Gen. G. I. Pokrovsky (New York: Praeger, 1959, 180 pp., \$4.00). This volume is an unabridged translation of the key writings of a Soviet scientist and military man on the influence of science and technology on modern warfare. It comprises a book published in 1956 by the official Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense in Moscow, a brochure written in 1957 for wide circles of the Soviet intelligentsia, and an article on intercontinental missiles. The author examines specific weapons systems, such as the hydrogen bomb, the ICBM, air defense missiles, and vertical-take-off aircraft. Alternate strategic systems are discussed, including earth satellites and balloons, as well as long-range bomber aircraft. The work is important for its presentation of the current orientation in Soviet military and strategic thinking.

The German-Polish Frontier, by W. M. Drzewieniecki (Chicago: Polish Western Association of America, 1959, 166 pp., \$3.00). Mr. Drzewieniecki is a native of Poland who now resides in the US and teaches Modern and Russian history at the State University of New York. His book is a study of the Oder-Neisse boundary between Poland and Germany, which has not yet been formally recognized by the Western powers. He presents the Polish viewpoint on the question of Poland's claim to the so-called "Western Territories," which were formerly German but have been administered by Poland since 1945 as an integral part of that country. Bibliography, index.



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